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ABSTRACT—Sentencing has become the most important part of a criminal
case. Over the past century, criminal trials have given way almost entirely to
pleas. Once a case is charged, it almost always ends up at sentencing. And
notably, judges learn little sentencing-relevant information about the case or
the defendant prior to sentencing and have significant discretion in
sentencing decisions. Thus, sentencing is the primary opportunity for the
defense to affect the outcome of the case by presenting mitigation: reasons
why the nature of the offense or characteristics of the defendant warrant a
lower sentence. It is surprising, then, that relatively little scholarship in
criminal law focuses on mitigation at sentencing. Fundamental questions
have not been explored: Do the Sentencing Guidelines—which largely limit
the relevance of mitigating evidence—make mitigation unimportant? Does
the extent or type of mitigation offered have any relationship with the
sentence imposed?
This Article fills that gap by examining a previously unexplored data
set: sentencing memoranda filed by defense attorneys in federal felony cases.
By systematically parsing categories of mitigating evidence and
quantitatively coding the evidence, I show that mitigation is a central
predictor of sentencing outcomes and that judges approach mitigation in a
modern way: rather than adhering to the strict, offense-centric structure that
has dominated sentencing since the advent of the Sentencing Guidelines in
the 1980s, judges individualize sentences in ways that consider the personal
characteristics of each defendant, beyond what the Guidelines anticipate.
And particular types of mitigation, such as science-based arguments about
mental and physical health, appear especially persuasive.
The results have significant implications for criminal justice policy:
while my data show that mitigation is critical to judges’ sentencing decisions,
both the Guidelines and procedural rules minimize mitigation, failing to
encourage both defense attorneys and prosecutors to investigate and consider
it. I suggest reforms to make sentencing more equitable, such as requiring
the investigation and presentation of mitigation to constitute effective
assistance of counsel, easing the barriers to obtaining relevant information
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on mental and physical health mitigation, and encouraging prosecutors to
consider mitigation in charging decisions and sentencing recommendations.
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INTRODUCTION
Until 2000, Precias Freeman lived a normal life. She grew up in a good
home, was active in her church, and was getting ready to have a baby.1 Then,
after she slipped in the shower and broke her tailbone, she was prescribed
hydrocodone—a common opioid—to manage her pain. 2 Her use quickly
turned into addiction. She worked for a doctor who—once the prescription
lapsed—allowed her to write her own thirty-pill prescriptions for the drug.3
She started small, but at the height of her addiction was taking sixty to eighty
pills per day, an amount that could easily kill a person who had not built up
such a tolerance.4 “[E]very[] day I woke up, . . . the first thing on my mind
was how do I not have to feel like I am about to die.”5

1 Transcript of Sent’g Hearing at 14, 28, 32, United States v. Freeman, 992 F.3d 268 (4th Cir. 2021)
(No. 17-CR-79).
2 Freeman, 992 F.3d at 271.
3 Id.
4 Transcript of Sent’g Hearing, supra note 1, at 14, 27.
5 Id. at 28.

1397

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

While Freeman initially took all of her pills herself, it was not long
before she was selling them to support her habit. 6 She began printing
duplicate prescriptions for other patients who had been prescribed opioids.7
After filling the prescriptions, she would take half the pills herself and sell
the rest—below market rate—to an acquaintance. 8 Eventually, the DEA
learned about the fake prescriptions, and Freeman was arrested and
prosecuted federally.9 Based in part on the number of pills she had sold over
a period of years, she faced an exceptionally high Sentencing Guideline
range: 210–240 months’ imprisonment.10 Freeman argued that she should be
sentenced below that range because her drug addiction was a mitigating
circumstance that reduced her culpability. 11 Her attorney explained how
Freeman had only sold the pills to support her own dependency; how she
suffered from the disease of addiction; how she needed treatment.12
The judge was unpersuaded: he sentenced Freeman to 210 months’
imprisonment. 13 She appealed and achieved an extraordinarily unusual
result: the Fourth Circuit vacated her sentence, holding that “the district court
failed to seriously consider Freeman’s addiction as mitigating.”14 It outlined
how drug addiction can “take over a person’s life” and explained that the
“overwhelming record evidence” of Freeman’s severe addiction merited a
variance below the Guideline range.15 The decision was remarkable—as the
dissenting judge noted, it was the first time in the history of the circuit that a
within-Guideline sentence had been vacated as substantively unreasonable.16
But was the district judge’s decision not to more strongly weigh
Freeman’s mitigating addiction evidence remarkable as well? The
Guidelines largely advise judges not to consider mitigating factors like the
ones in Freeman.17 But the federal sentencing statute, in contrast, permits
judges to weigh extremely broad factors such as the “nature and
circumstances of the offense” and the “history and characteristics” of the

Freeman, 992 F.3d at 271–72; Transcript of Sent’g Hearing, supra note 1, at 27–28.
Freeman, 992 F.3d at 271.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 272; id. at 293 (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 286 (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting).
11 Id. at 283–84.
12 Transcript of Sent’g Hearing, supra note 1, at 13–18.
13 Freeman, 992 F.3d at 274.
14 Id. at 280–81.
15 Id. at 280. The court also identified other mitigating circumstances that influenced its decision,
including the fact that Freeman’s sentence was higher than those of other similarly situated defendants
and that there were no identifiable victims of the offense. Id. at 280–81.
16 Id. at 281 (Quattlebaum, J., dissenting).
17 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.4 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
6
7
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defendant in deciding whether to impose a within-Guideline sentence.18 How
do those competing influences affect sentencing decisions? Was it unusual
for the judge to discount Freeman’s addiction, or was it typical? Would the
judge have treated other possible mitigation—such as a difficult upbringing
or evidence of Freeman’s good character or remorse—differently? What
about mitigating aspects of the crime itself, such as the lack of direct victims,
or the fact that Freeman made little money from the drug sales?
Questions like these are central to our understanding of how judges
impose sentences. And their answers should shape how we structure
sentencing rules and doctrines. But surprisingly, very little legal scholarship
has explored sentencing mitigation in noncapital cases. While a few scholars
have categorized types of mitigation and placed them within broader
theoretical frameworks, and some laboratory studies have tried to model
mitigation’s relationship with general views of criminal culpability, almost
none have examined mitigation in a real-world context.
This Article fills that gap. I report the results from the first empirical
study examining mitigation practices in real noncapital federal cases. I
gathered data by coding sentencing memoranda filed by defense attorneys in
over 300 felony cases. By systematically identifying and parsing common
categories of mitigation, quantitatively coding the evidence, and statistically
examining the relationships between the text and the sentence imposed, I
show that mitigation is a significant predictor of sentencing outcomes and
that judges approach mitigation in a modern way: rather than adhering to the
strict, offense-centric structure that has dominated sentencing since the
advent of the Sentencing Guidelines in the 1980s, judges individualize their
sentences in ways that consider the personal characteristics of each
defendant, beyond what the Sentencing Guidelines anticipate. The results
have significant implications for criminal justice policy: while my data
suggest that mitigation may be important to judges’ sentencing decisions,
both the Guidelines and procedural rules and doctrines minimize mitigation,
failing to encourage either defense attorneys or prosecutors to investigate
and consider it.
The Article proceeds in six Parts. In Part I, I describe how sentencing
has become the most critical part of a criminal case and why sentencing
memoranda may be so influential in judges’ sentencing decisions. With trials
having given way almost entirely to guilty pleas, and with most convictions
giving judges significant authority to choose from a wide range of potential
sentences, sentencing affects the defendant’s future more than any other part
of the case. Judges also have significant discretion at sentencing and are well
18

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
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insulated from sentencing appeals. And surprisingly, judges learn little
sentencing-relevant information during earlier stages of the case. They are
not typically assigned to the case until it has passed the early substantive
portions of litigation, and common events such as plea hearings provide
judges with little actual information about the case or defendant. Instead,
judges learn nearly all relevant sentencing facts from either the presentence
report provided by the probation department or the parties’ sentencing
memoranda—briefs in which the defense is free to outline virtually any type
of mitigation that favors a reduced sentence. And while the Sentencing
Guidelines largely restrict the importance of mitigation, the Supreme Court’s
decision in United States v. Booker allowed judges to sentence outside of the
Guidelines by weighing broad statutory factors such as the “nature and
circumstances of the offense” and the “history and characteristics” of the
defendant, setting up a tension between the Guidelines and the statute.19
In Part II, I analyze the limited, preexisting empirical research on the
types of mitigating factors that might impact a judge’s sentencing decision.
I describe two different categories of data: first, surveys given to federal
judges asking them to rank how relevant various types of mitigation typically
are to their sentencing decisions; and second, laboratory experiments, in
which researchers provide laypeople with vignettes featuring crime
scenarios with various types of mitigating information, asking them to make
culpability judgments based on the vignettes. The data imply that several
types of mitigation may be important, but they also have some inconsistent
results and do not reflect the full array of considerations that go into real
sentences.
In Part III, I describe my novel approach to the question: coding
sentencing memoranda filed by defense attorneys in federal felony cases and
examining the relationship between mitigation and the sentence imposed. I
divide mitigation primarily into “offense” mitigation—mitigating facts
related to the offense itself—and “personal” mitigation—mitigating
characteristics about the defendant, independent of the crime. Under those
broad umbrellas, I identified sixteen different common categories of
mitigation and systematically parsed and coded each type to identify
relationships between the extent of presentation of each category (measured
by number of words) and the sentence imposed. The study is the first of its
kind, exploring the mitigating evidence that defense attorneys present in a
broad variety of criminal contexts. I also describe my hypotheses—based on
the survey and experimental literature—in Part IV.

19
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Part V reports the results from my study. I find broad support for the
notion that mitigation is critically important at sentencing, despite a
Guideline system that minimizes it. Contrary to the rigid, offense-centric
structure that the Guidelines encourage, judges’ sentences are strongly
associated with the mitigating evidence presented by defense counsel.
Lengthier and more robust mitigating arguments are associated with lower
sentences relative to a defendant’s Guideline range. In particular, extensive
presentation of personal mitigation correlates more strongly with lower
sentences than offense mitigation. Mitigating arguments that are supported
by concrete evidence—such as medical records or specific acts
demonstrating remorse—are also associated with lower sentences. And
science-based arguments about the defendant’s mental and physical health
that are relevant to the offense—such as addiction or mental illness—are
most strongly associated with reduced sentences.
In Part VI, I discuss the legal and policy implications of my results.
While mitigation appears to influence judges’ decisions, current procedural
structures do not encourage significant mitigation in most cases. I focus on
three areas for potential reform. First, broadening effective assistance of
counsel. In capital cases, the investigation and presentation of mitigating
evidence is treated as a critical part of a defense attorney’s role, and attorneys
who do not properly research and present mitigation can sometimes be found
ineffective. But the same is not true for attorneys in noncapital felony cases,
resulting in enormous disparities in the quantity and quality of mitigation
presented and reducing the extent to which defendants’ interests are
protected. Second, increasing neuroscience-based health mitigation
evidence. In my data, health-related mitigation had a substantially stronger
association with reduced sentences than any other type of mitigation, and
mental-health-related mitigation was a strong component of that.
Neuroscience-based mitigation—in the form of behavioral testing or
imaging examining defendants for cognitive impairments—has extensive
potential to provide strong mitigating evidence, yet is uncommon outside of
cases involving defendants who present competency concerns. Third,
presenting mitigation to prosecutors. Prosecutors play a significant role in
determining sentences, both through the plea deals they offer and their
sentencing recommendations to judges. And prosecutors may be growing
more receptive to mitigating arguments with the wave of progressive
prosecutors who have taken office over the past five years. Yet it is likely
that prosecutors are rarely presented with mitigating evidence to consider. I
explore ways to remedy this problem and encourage early and extensive
presentation of mitigation to prosecutors.
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I.

MITIGATION’S IMPORTANCE IN MODERN SENTENCING
A. The Critical Role of Sentencing

Criminal prosecutions involve an array of complex procedures, but over
the past century, those procedures have increasingly become secondary to
one critical moment of the case: sentencing. Trials—once the central
component of the criminal justice system—have become nearly extinct.20
Between 2017 and 2018, only about 2% of federal felony cases resulted in
trials, and state courts had only slightly higher rates.21 Where trial may once
have been thought of as the most important part of the case, it is no longer.
Instead, we have “a system of pleas, not a system of trials,” to the point where
pleading “is not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal
justice system.”22 With so many cases resulting in pleas, nearly every case
charged is destined for sentencing. Of the few that do reach trial, most will
still end up at sentencing following a conviction.23
Because there are many procedural steps in a criminal case, one might
think that, by the time the case reaches sentencing, the judge is intimately
familiar with it, making the sentencing procedure itself relatively rote. Not
so. Many of the most substantive steps happen before the case is even
assigned to the trial judge who will later sentence the defendant. Take the
federal system, for example.24 Before a suspect is arrested, a prosecutor may
present a criminal complaint to the court seeking an arrest warrant.25 The
complaint is one of the most detailed documents describing the
circumstances of the alleged offense and characteristics of the defendant

20 See, e.g., Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal Jury Trial: From
Trial Judges to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 133 (2018) (“[F]rom 2006 to 2016, the
percentage of defendants disposed of by jury trials declined by forty-seven percent.”).
21 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., JUDICIAL BUSINESS 2018, at tbl.D-4, https://www.uscourts.gov/
sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_d4_0930.2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/XS8K-3A27]; Lafler v. Cooper,
566 U.S. 156, 170 (2012) (“Ninety-seven percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state
convictions are the result of guilty pleas.”).
22 Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 143–44 (2012) (first quoting Lafler, 566 U.S. at 170; and then
quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912
(1992)).
23 ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., supra note 21, tbl.D-4 (reporting just 320 federal trial acquittals
against 1,559 federal trial convictions in the year ending September 30, 2018).
24 I focus primarily on the federal system here because this project uses federal sentencing
memoranda as a data set, so my description of the underlying federal procedure is most relevant to the
conclusions I make. But while state systems have many individual differences, they are similar to the
federal system in that the trial judge has little exposure to the case prior to sentencing. See generally NEAL
B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS., STATE SENTENCING GUIDELINES:
PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 1–27 (2008) (outlining state sentencing structures).
25 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 3.
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(such as any criminal history). 26 But the complaint is reviewed by a
magistrate judge, before the district judge is assigned. 27 Likewise, search
warrants—of which there may be dozens in a single case—contain a wealth
of information about the case and its participants, and are reviewed by the
magistrate judge, not the district judge.28
The magistrate judge’s primary role continues after arrest. In felony
cases, the magistrate judge oversees the defendant’s initial appearance in
court and one of the most substantive events prior to sentencing: a hearing
to determine whether the defendant will be detained pending trial or placed
on pretrial release.29 That hearing involves a detailed discussion of both “the
nature and circumstances of the offense charged” and “the history and
characteristics” of the defendant. 30 Functionally, the prosecutor typically
describes the investigation and circumstances of the crime in detail, and the
defense attorney provides positive characteristics about the defendant that
counsel in favor of pretrial release.
Other players also learn about the case earlier than the district judge:
The prosecution typically presents the case to a grand jury (or occasionally
to the magistrate judge) to secure an indictment, but that testimony is outside
of the view of the court and is typically never revealed to the district judge.31
And after the prosecution secures an indictment, the defendant is entitled to
an arraignment in open court at which the magistrate judge ensures the
defendant has received a copy of the indictment and reviews it with the
defendant.32 None of these proceedings are reviewed by the district judge in
the ordinary course.
Only after all of these procedural steps are complete is the case even
assigned to the district judge who oversees its later elements, including
26 Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure only require that a complaint be a “statement
of the essential facts” of the charge, id., the extent of these essential facts can be quite lengthy. See, e.g.,
Complaint, United States v. Santos, No. 10-mj-30457 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 29, 2010) (describing, across forty
pages, the contents of 105 separate phone conversations associated with a conspiracy to distribute
marijuana and cocaine).
27 FED. R. CRIM. P. 3 (“[The complaint] must be made under oath before a magistrate judge or, if
none is reasonably available, before a state or local judicial officer.”).
28 Id. r. 41(b)–(e) (describing the magistrate judge as the arbiter of federal search warrants).
29 Id. r. 5(d)(3); 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (outlining statutory rules for release or detention of a defendant
pending trial).
30 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (noting that the magistrate judge must also consider “the weight of the
evidence” favoring release or detention and “the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or
the community that would be posed by the person’s release”).
31 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring presentment or indictment by a grand jury for “capital, or
otherwise infamous crime[s]”); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d); see also Charging, OFF. OF U.S. ATT’YS,
https://www.justice.gov/usao/justice-101/charging [https://perma.cc/FC36-543G] (describing grand jury
process).
32 FED. R. CRIM. P. 10.
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sentencing.33 But after arraignment, there are almost no substantial hearings
that occur as a matter of course, which means the district judge typically
learns little about the case prior to sentencing. 34 If the defendant pleads
guilty, the only hearing that the district judge must necessarily conduct prior
to sentencing is a plea hearing.35 And while one might intuitively think that
a plea hearing would involve significant discussion of the substance of the
case, it is instead largely focused on procedure. Its main component involves
the district judge advising the defendant of the rights that he relinquishes by
pleading guilty and determining whether the defendant’s plea is voluntary.36
While the defendant must give a factual basis for the plea, that can be as
simple as the defendant merely agreeing that he committed the elements of
the offense, without any further detail.37
Of course, there are other possible stages prior to sentencing at which
the district judge might learn more about the case’s substance. In rare cases,
there will be a trial, or the parties may trigger less extensive (but still
substantive) litigation. The defendant may file a motion to suppress evidence
or otherwise challenge the indictment or preindictment procedure, or the
parties may file evidentiary motions in preparation for trial or have discovery
disputes that must be resolved by the court.38 But extensive motion practice
is infrequent, and cases commonly resolve without any substantive motions.
So, most cases arrive at sentencing with the judge as a relatively fresh
slate. How do judges learn the relevant information they need to impose a
sentence? As described in more detail below, they primarily learn it through
two documents. First, the probation department prepares a presentence report

33

See PETER G. MCCABE, A GUIDE TO THE FEDERAL MAGISTRATE JUDGE SYSTEM 22–30 (2014),
https://www.fedbar.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/FBA-White-Paper-2016-pdf-2.pdf [https://perma.
cc/RCN6-A9ES] (noting that “[m]agistrate judges have no authority to dispose of felony cases,” but
describing how they conduct initial felony proceedings in most cases). The system is similar in most
states. For example, in Michigan, initial proceedings—including the probable cause hearing that often
functions as an initial mini-trial in the case—are conducted by a district judge, but a circuit judge is then
assigned for sentencing, and that judge also typically handles pleas. See MICH. COMP. LAWS § 766.4
(1927); MICH. CT. R. 6.008 (1985) (stating that “[t]he district court has jurisdiction over all . . . felonies
through the preliminary examination,” while the “circuit court has jurisdiction over all felonies from the
bindover from the district court”).
34 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 10–12 (outlining no hearings as a matter of course between arraignment and
a plea hearing).
35 See id. r. 11(b)(1) (“Before the court accepts a plea of guilty[,] . . . the court must address the
defendant personally in open court.”).
36 Id. r. 11(b)(1)–(2).
37 See id. r. 11(b)(3); Guilty Pleas, 38 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 403, 413 n.1322 (2009) (“A
judge may find a factual basis to support the plea from anything that appears in the record, including the
government’s own proffer. The government need not present uncontroverted evidence of guilt; it need
only submit evidence based on which a court could reasonably find the defendant guilty.”).
38 See generally FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b)(3) (outlining various pretrial motions).
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(PSR) with information about the offense and the defendant.39 Second, the
parties file briefs—typically called “sentencing memoranda”—arguing their
positions.40
Once judges have this information, they have significant discretion in
determining the sentence. While some federal crimes carry statutory
penalties that either require a mandatory minimum sentence or a specific
statutory sentence that the judge must impose, most statutes simply provide
an upper limit, allowing the judge to impose a sentence anywhere as high as
that limit or as low as probation.41 The vast majority of federal convictions
are for crimes not carrying any mandatory penalties: in 2016, only about 13%
of all federal defendants sentenced were subject to a mandatory minimum
penalty on any of their convictions.42 All convictions—whether involving a
mandatory sentence or not—result in the calculation of a Sentencing
Guideline range for the judge to consider.43 But after the Supreme Court’s
landmark decision in United States v. Booker in 2005, 44 judges gained
flexibility to sentence outside the Guidelines, which became the “starting
point and the initial benchmark” for the judge’s sentence, rather than the
ending point.45 Judges have two options in sentencing a defendant outside of
the Guideline range: They can depart from the range either upward or
downward by finding one of a number of aggravating or mitigating
circumstances described in the Guidelines.46 But much more commonly, they
can vary from the Guideline range and impose a sentence outside of it based
on any of the (very broad) sentencing factors outlined in the primary federal
sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).47 Indeed, in the 2016 fiscal year,
49% of federal sentences were below the bottom of the Guideline range.48

39

Id. r. 32(d).
See infra notes 58–63.
41 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (providing a ten-year statutory maximum penalty—but no
mandatory minimum penalty—for most federal firearms offenses); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (providing
the same for drug trafficking offenses not reaching certain quantities and not resulting in death).
42 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, AN OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 37 (2017) (outlining that 8,342 of 62,251 sentenced defendants were subject
to a mandatory minimum penalty).
43 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(5), introductory cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2018).
44 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).
45 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007); see also Booker, 543 U.S. at 245 (revising the
Guidelines and making them “effectively advisory”).
46 See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b), introductory cmt.
47 For a helpful discussion of the difference between a departure and a variance, see United States v.
Grams, 566 F.3d 683, 686–87 (6th Cir. 2009).
48 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, Sourcebook of Federal Sentencing Statistics tbl.N (2016), https://
www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/annual-reports-and-sourcebooks/2016/
TableN.pdf [https://perma.cc/9ZL4-N2WK].
40
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Judges’ sentencing discretion is enhanced by the fact that they can
consider almost any evidence at sentencing.49 The Federal Rules of Evidence
do not apply. 50 And almost all evidence is relevant to the appropriate
sentencing considerations too; because the § 3553(a) factors that judges must
consider at sentencing are so broad (encompassing, for example, “the nature
and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant” and the need “to reflect the seriousness of the offense”), most
evidence will bear on those considerations.51
The last phase of criminal procedure—appeal—continues the pattern of
trial judges’ near-total discretion over sentencing. Sentences are extremely
well insulated from reversal: they are reviewed only for abuse of discretion.52
This means that a sentence is only reversed if the judge (1) commits a
“significant procedural error,” such as incorrectly calculating the Guidelines,
or (2) applies a substantively unreasonable sentence, meaning the judge
improperly weighed the sentencing factors outlined in § 3553(a).53 This same
standard of review applies “[r]egardless of whether the sentence imposed is
inside or outside the Guidelines range.”54 And because the § 3553(a) factors
are so broad, judges’ sentences are very rarely reversed for substantive
unreasonableness.55 Thus, unless a judge makes an error in calculating the
Guidelines or following basic sentencing procedure, her sentencing
decisions are nearly unreviewable.
*

*

*

So far, we have learned a few things. (1) Nearly all criminal cases reach
sentencing, most often through pleas; (2) trial judges learn almost all
information relevant to sentencing through presentencing briefing or at the
hearing itself; and (3) judges have significant discretion to consider a large
swath of information and impose a sentence that is nearly certain to survive
appellate review. Sentencing has arguably become the most critical part of
49 Kevin R. Reitz, Proof of Aggravating and Mitigating Facts at Sentencing, in MITIGATION AND
AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING 228, 231 (Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011); Gabriel J. Chin, Collateral
Consequences and Criminal Justice: Future Policy and Constitutional Directions, 102 MARQ. L. REV.
233, 251 (2018) (“[C]ourts can consider almost everything when exercising their sentencing
discretion . . . .”).
50 FED. R. EVID. 1101(d). There is one exception: evidentiary rules protecting privileges do apply.
51 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
52 Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
53 Id.
54 Id.
55 See Carrie Leonetti, De Facto Mandatory: A Quantitative Assessment of Reasonableness Review
After Booker, 66 DEPAUL L. REV. 51, 89 (2016) (describing “extraordinary deference to district court
sentences”).
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the case. 56 And because of the parties’ direct involvement in sentencing
through the filing of sentencing memoranda and the presentation of
evidence, sentencing is a critical opportunity for the lawyers—particularly
defense attorneys—to influence the outcome. 57 How? By presenting
mitigating evidence to the judge asserting why the defendant should be given
a lower sentence. In the next Section, I explore the framework of mitigation
in sentencing today, focusing on the way mitigation is presented to the judge
and the kinds of mitigation that are relevant.
B. The Framework of Sentencing and Mitigation
Once a defendant has been convicted of a federal offense—whether by
plea or trial—there are two primary mechanisms by which a judge receives
information relevant to sentencing prior to the hearing. The first is the
presentence report (PSR). After conviction, a probation officer is assigned to
the case to conduct a presentence investigation.58 The officer interviews the
defendant to assess his “history and characteristics,” including any criminal
record, financial circumstances, and “circumstances affecting the
defendant’s behavior that may be helpful in imposing sentence,” which often
include information about the defendant’s family background, upbringing,
history of physical or mental illness, drug use, and a variety of other
characteristics.59 Based on that information, the probation officer prepares a
report, which includes information from the interview, along with a
background of the offense and the probation officer’s calculation of the
relevant Sentencing Guidelines. 60 The officer provides that report to the
parties and the judge.61 In most cases, the report is the judge’s first in-depth
look at both the nature of the offense and the characteristics of the defendant.

56 As U.S. District Judge Robert Conrad has put it, “Once viewed as ‘trial judges,’ federal district
judges are increasingly seen as ‘sentencing judges.’” Conrad & Clements, supra note 20, at 102. I note,
however, that plea bargaining is also extremely influential in determining both criminal liability and the
ultimate sentence, which I explore in more detail below. Infra notes 345–348.
57 Conrad & Clements, supra note 20, at 102 (explaining that criminal attorneys “can now more aptly
be termed ‘sentencing advocates’ than ‘trial lawyers’” and noting that prosecutors in one federal district
appeared at only 16 trials, compared with over 900 sentencing hearings and supervised release revocation
hearings, in one year).
58 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c).
59 Id. r. 32(d)(2)(A); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 342 (2007).
60 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)(1). PSRs are confidential and are not made a part of the public record. See,
e.g., Standing Order 2015-02 (D. Md. Feb. 5, 2015), https://www.mdd.uscourts.gov/sites/mdd/files/
2015-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/29WH-49RV] (“[P]resentence reports are confidential court records to
which the public has no right of access.”). The Sentencing Commission has, however, made a template
PSR available. U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, Sample Presentence Report (2009), https://www.icpsr.umich.edu/
summerprog/2009/nijworkshop/PSRDrugScenario.pdf [https://perma.cc/VM3J-RUHY].
61 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(g).
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The second mechanism by which the judge receives prehearing
sentencing information is the primary subject of this study: the sentencing
memorandum. Though the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not
require the parties to file a sentencing memorandum (nor do they require the
judge to permit the parties to do so), most jurisdictions permit them (and
many judges require them).62 The sentencing memorandum is the primary—
and typically the only—way attorneys can provide information to the court
advocating for a particular sentence before the sentencing hearing. Thus, it
is the main vehicle by which defense attorneys can provide mitigation to the
court counseling for a lower sentence.63
Because there are no formal rules governing what sentencing
memoranda can contain, they take many forms. Some memoranda focus
heavily on the defendant’s background, portraying the defendant as a person
with a full life independent of the crime he committed. Others focus much
more heavily on the crime, describing mitigating circumstances of the
offense, such as the defendant’s limited role or the small amount of harm
caused. And sentencing memoranda often contain a rich array of information
that would never be part of the PSR. While a PSR may, for example, report
that the defendant has a history of mental illness, it will not detail how that
mental illness impacted the defendant’s life or provide a narrative of how the
illness affects culpability. The PSR’s role in presenting mitigation might be
thought of as a movie trailer: while it gives a broad preview of what is to
come, the sentencing memorandum contains the full plot.
An effective defendant’s sentencing memorandum, of course, must
contain information that is legally relevant to the judge’s sentencing
decision. What sources provide authority for what can be considered
mitigating? A brief look at the history of sentencing law is instructive in
understanding the current framework.
Before 1987, federal judges imposed indeterminate sentences: guided
only by statutory maximums and minimums, they sentenced the defendant
to a maximum and minimum range of imprisonment, and parole boards

62 See infra note 217 and accompanying text (describing jurisdictions from which sentencing
memoranda were gathered for this study). For example, Judge Victoria Roberts of the Eastern District of
Michigan notes that the court “will request sentencing memoranda on matters in contention.” Victoria A.
Roberts, Practice Guidelines, Special Notes—Criminal Cases, U.S. DIST. CT. E.D. MICH., https://www.
mied.uscourts.gov/altindex.cfm?pagefunction=pgToPDFAll&judgeID=19
[https://perma.cc/FSA6WA9S].
63 Attorneys do, of course, conduct sentencing advocacy at the sentencing hearing itself, in addition
to filing a sentencing memorandum. But that advocacy is likely less impactful than the sentencing
memorandum. By the time of the sentencing hearing, the judge has already considered most of the
relevant sentencing arguments by reviewing the parties’ sentencing memoranda and meeting with the
probation officer to discuss the PSR.
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determined when prisoners were released.64 This was standard for the day: in
1970, every state also had a similar indeterminate system.65 Because there
was no specific sentencing statute or other guidepost to restrict the bases on
which judges sentenced, they had an enormous amount of discretion. 66
Inherent in this model was an individualized sentencing focus, in which
judges had flexibility to consider mitigating evidence that they found
relevant. The dominant theory of sentencing was rehabilitation, and
sentencing decisions were focused heavily on individual defendants’
personal history and characteristics.67
The drawbacks of that system are well documented: the significant
discretion that the indeterminate system provided to judges and parole
officials raised concerns that sentences and parole decisions were
unpredictable, inconsistent across similarly situated individuals, and, most
troublingly, subject to discrimination based on race, gender, and other
inappropriate characteristics.68 Eventually, these concerns culminated in the
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.69 Among a number of substantive changes,
64 See Michael Tonry, Twenty Years of Sentencing Reform: Steps Forward, Steps Backward,
78 JUDICATURE 169, 169–70 (1995); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING: THE BASICS 1
(2018); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
65 Tonry, supra note 64, at 169.
66 See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Balanced and Purposeful Departures: Fixing a Jurisprudence that
Undermines the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 21, 25 (2000) (noting the “vast
and virtually unlimited discretion” that existed in sentencing for the first seventy-five years of the
twentieth century); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Federal Criminal Sentencing Reform: Congress and the United
States Sentencing Commission, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 291, 297 (1993) (describing “unfettered
judicial discretion” prior to enactment of the Guidelines).
67 See Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern
Sentencing Reforms, 58 STAN. L. REV. 277, 278 (2005); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949)
(“Retribution is no longer the dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of
offenders have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”).
68 See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 54 (1972)
(discussing the harms that come from “unbounded discretion” in indeterminate sentencing schemes);
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 23–25 (1972) (highlighting how
judicial bias and idiosyncratic differences among judges lead to dramatically different sentencing
outcomes for defendants in an indeterminate regime); Ilene H. Nagel, Structuring Sentencing Discretion:
The New Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 883, 895 (1990) (pointing to
studies from as early as 1933 that found an “offender’s race, sex, religion, income, education, occupation
and other status characteristics . . . influence[d] judicial outcomes” in sentencing). For a detailed
discussion of this period of sentencing reform, see Berman, supra note 66, at 26–41.
69 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551–
3742); see also 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (noting purpose of “avoiding unwarranted sentencing” in the
Act); Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996) (“The goal of the Sentencing Guidelines is, of
course, to reduce unjustified disparities and so reach toward the evenhandedness and neutrality that are
the distinguishing marks of any principled system of justice. In this respect, the Guidelines provide
uniformity, predictability, and a degree of detachment lacking in our earlier system.”). For an excellent
review of the complex factors that led to the development of the Guidelines, see KATE STITH & JOSÉ A.
CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 38–77 (1998).
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the Act abolished the federal parole system, enacted the federal sentencing
statute now codified as 18 U.S.C. § 3553, established the U.S. Sentencing
Commission, and required that sentences fall within the Sentencing
Guidelines that were later promulgated by the Commission.70 Notably, while
the Sentencing Reform Act set standards in place to attempt to rein in
sentencing disparity, it did not adopt any particular theory of punishment, or
even describe the central purpose of sentencing.71
The Guidelines provided (and still provide) the first source of authority
on mitigation for a sentencing judge to examine. The Sentencing Reform Act
directed the Commission to “consider whether [a number of individual
characteristics] have any relevance to the nature . . . of an appropriate
sentence, and shall take them into account only to the extent that they do
have relevance.”72 The Commission did this in several ways. First, it made
the defendant’s criminal history a central part of the Guideline calculation.73
Second, it outlined the individual characteristics described in the Sentencing
Reform Act and included policy statements in the Guidelines as to whether
they were relevant in sentencing. Four factors “may be relevant in
determining whether a departure is warranted” under the Guidelines: age,
mental and emotional conditions, physical condition (including drug or
alcohol dependence), and prior military service.74 But most other individual
characteristics outlined in the Sentencing Reform Act “are not ordinarily
relevant in determining whether a departure is warranted.” 75 Thus, the
Guidelines largely restrict the importance of mitigation and confine it to very
specific categories.
With most potential mitigating factors excluded from serious
consideration, the Guidelines are instead focused on aggravating
characteristics. The Guideline range in each case is largely made up of (1) an
offense level, which is primarily determined by the statute of conviction and
the number and severity of aggravating factors involved in the offense
70

Summary: H.R.5773 - Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.
gov/bill/98th-congress/house-bill/5773 [https://perma.cc/W2L3-NTTS]; see also 28 U.S.C. § 991
(establishing the U.S. Sentencing Commission); 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (codifying the federal sentencing
statute).
71 Carissa Byrne Hessick & Douglas A. Berman, Towards a Theory of Mitigation, 96 B.U. L. REV.
161, 170–72 (2016).
72 28 U.S.C. § 994(d). For a discussion of the Guidelines’ implementation of this directive, see
generally U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021)
(describing the relevance of certain offender characteristics in sentencing).
73 See generally U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1 (outlining methods of quantifying each
defendant’s criminal history, resulting in a criminal history category that adjusts the applicable
Sentencing Guideline range).
74 Id. ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt.; see also id. §§ 5H1.1, .3–.4, .11.
75 Id. § 5H1.2 (emphasis added); see also id. §§ 5H1.5–.7, .11–.12.
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itself,76 and (2) the defendant’s criminal history score. 77 As other scholars
have noted, the Guidelines function to “significantly restrict[] the role of
mitigation at sentencing.”78
Does this render individualized mitigation at sentencing largely
irrelevant in the federal system? For a period, it did. 79 Until 2005, the
Guidelines were “mandatory and binding on all judges,” and their sentences
had to follow the Guidelines’ provisions.80 While sentencing judges could
sentence outside the Guidelines if that sentence was justified by a departure,
the structure of the Guidelines restricted mitigation so greatly that departures
were rarely warranted. 81 Thus, at the time, the presentation of mitigating
evidence in categories disfavored by the Guidelines would have been
relatively unhelpful in the vast majority of cases because the Guidelines
prevented judges from considering it relevant beyond minor adjustments to
a within-Guidelines sentence.
Then, in 2005, the system changed dramatically. Following a series of
decisions holding that the Sixth Amendment requires that any facts
increasing the statutory penalty for a crime must be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt,82 the Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker that
the mandatory Guideline scheme outlined in the Sentencing Reform Act
76 See id. ch. 2–3. For example, the primary drug distribution guideline, § 2D1.1, outlines
aggravating factors that, if present, raise the offense level (such as the presence of a weapon, the use of
violence, the use of bribes, or the maintenance of a premise for distributing drugs). Id. § 2D1.1(b)(1)–(2),
(11)–(12).
77 See generally id. ch. 4 (providing “points” for prior convictions of various severities, which are
then totaled to place each defendant in a criminal history “category,” which affects the final Guideline
range).
78 Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 172; Berman, supra note 67, at 289 (“A broad array of
potentially mitigating offender characteristics have been formally or functionally rendered ‘not ordinarily
relevant’ or largely inconsequential to federal sentencing determinations.”); see also Berman, supra note
66, at 46–49 (describing the Commission’s view that sentencing departures based on mitigating factors
should be “rare”); Carissa Byrne Hessick, Why Are Only Bad Acts Good Sentencing Factors?, 88 B.U.
L. REV. 1109, 1111 (2008) (“Trial judges have occasionally reduced a defendant’s sentence on the basis
of prior good actions that are unrelated to the conviction, such as military service or charitable work. Such
decisions, however, have met resistance from the U.S. Sentencing Commission and federal appellate
courts . . . .”).
79 See Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 172–73 (describing the limited state of mitigation at
sentencing leading up to United States v. Booker).
80 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233 (2005).
81 See id. at 234 (“[D]epartures are not available in every case, and in fact are unavailable in most.
In most cases, as a matter of law, the Commission will have adequately taken all relevant factors into
account, and no departure will be legally permissible. In those instances, the judge is bound to impose a
sentence within the Guidelines range.”).
82 See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (noting that the lone exception is the fact
of a prior conviction, which may itself increase the statutory penalty without being proved to a jury);
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004) (applying rule to mandatory state sentencing
guideline scheme).
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violated the constitutional requirement.83 The Court’s remedy was to strike
the provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act that made the Guidelines
mandatory, thus making them “effectively advisory.”84
Once the Guidelines were advisory, the universe of potentially relevant
mitigating evidence expanded greatly. The Guidelines are one component of
the statutory “factors to be considered in imposing a sentence” under
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).85 But after Booker, judges are no longer required to
restrict their considerations of mitigation to what the Guidelines allow. And
while the Guidelines significantly limit the relevance of most mitigation,
§ 3553(a) does not. Quite the contrary: it instructs judges to weigh incredibly
broad factors in determining the sentence. The first two—the ones most
commonly referenced at sentencing86—are “the nature and circumstances of
the offense” and “the history and characteristics of the defendant.”87 While
potential mitigation such as a disadvantaged upbringing or evidence of good
character was generally irrelevant under the Guidelines, it is central to “the
history and characteristics of the defendant.”88 After Booker, there is tension
between the Guidelines’ approach and the sentencing statute’s approach:
while the Guidelines remain central to sentencing, if mitigation truly matters
to judges, there is now room for them to consider it.89
In addition to the flexibility brought about by Booker, there are other
reasons to believe that a defendant’s history and characteristics are now
becoming more important as sentencing considerations. 90 First, Supreme
Court jurisprudence has increasingly recognized that individual defendant
characteristics are critical to sentencing. Even before Booker, the Supreme
83 Booker, 543 U.S. at 243–44. As the Court explained, judge-found facts that raise a mandatory
sentencing guideline scheme are no less constitutionally problematic than judge-found facts that raise a
statutory penalty. Id. at 232–33.
84 Id. at 245.
85 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), (a)(4).
86 See infra Section III.A.
87 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
88 See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 364–65 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Matters such
as age, education, mental or emotional condition, medical condition (including drug or alcohol addiction),
employment history, lack of guidance as a youth, family ties, or military, civic, charitable, or public
service are not ordinarily considered under the Guidelines. These are, however, matters that § 3553(a)
authorizes the sentencing judge to consider.” (citation omitted)).
89 Compare Paul J. Hofer, Federal Sentencing After Booker, 48 CRIME & JUST. 137, 145 (2019)
(“While Booker increased judicial discretion, it has done relatively little to address excessive severity and
use of incarceration.”), with Berman, supra note 67, at 291 (“[M]any federal district judges have started
to use the new discretion they possess in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker to consider
and give effect to offender characteristics at sentencing.”).
90 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 67, at 289–91 (noting that recent Supreme Court cases have given
federal judges authority to consider these mitigating characteristics and explaining how state sentencing
guidelines take these characteristics into account).
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Court explained that “[i]t has been uniform and constant in the federal
judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to consider every convicted person
as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human failings that
sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to
ensue.”91 Since then, the Court has recognized that “possession of the fullest
information possible concerning the defendant’s life and characteristics” is
“[h]ighly relevant—if not essential—to [the] selection of an appropriate
sentence.” 92 The Court has also recognized that modern neuroscience
indicates that individual psychological and physical differences can affect
behavior, influencing culpability. For example, in Graham v. Florida, the
Court opined that because “parts of the brain involved in behavior control
continue to mature through late adolescence,” juvenile offenders’ crimes are
“not as morally reprehensible as [those] of an adult.”93
Second, legislative reforms have pushed in an individualized direction
too. The First Step Act of 2018—a rare bipartisan piece of legislation—
stands as a recent example.94 That statute shifted the balance back toward
individualized sentencing and rehabilitation by reducing or eliminating a
number of mandatory minimum sentencing statutes, requiring the
Department of Justice to develop standards to assess the recidivism risk of
defendants, and permitting defendants to directly request post-sentencing
reductions from courts based on individual circumstances.95
Third, a wave of social reform efforts—gaining in mainstream
popularity following the 2020 murder of George Floyd and resulting
protests—have focused on reducing mass incarceration, in part through more
individualized sentencing. Indeed, President Joe Biden’s 2020 presidential
campaign platform endorsed legislation that would encourage reduced
sentences for individuals whose criminal conduct was driven by substance

91

Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113 (1996).
Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476, 488 (2011) (alterations in original).
93 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012) (explaining that
juveniles’ “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences—both lessen[] a
child’s moral culpability and enhance[] the prospect that, as the years go by and neurological development
occurs, his deficiencies will be reformed” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
94 Ames Grawert & Tim Lau, How the FIRST STEP Act Became Law—and What Happens Next,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 4, 2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/analysis-opinion/
how-first-step-act-became-law-and-what-happens-next [https://perma.cc/9HDB-J2SA] (outlining the bill
as identifying “criminal justice reform as a rare space for bipartisan consensus and cooperation in a
fractured national political environment”).
95 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, §§ 101–102, 401–404, 603 132 Stat. 5194, 5195–96,
5208, 5220–22, 5238 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.).
92
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abuse or mental health disorders, or who are likely to age out of crime.96 And
while social reforms are separate from judicial decisions, they can be a
guidepost for future sentencing behavior and demonstrate shifting views
toward sentencing. In short, there appears to have been a broad shift away
from the rigid sentencing policy developed in the 1980s toward a modern
approach of greater individualization and consideration of each defendant’s
personal characteristics.
We have now reviewed the two main sources of authority for what can
be considered mitigating at sentencing: the Guidelines, which provide for
limited mitigation, and § 3553(a), which provides for broad mitigation. And
while some states limit the potential categories of mitigation more than the
federal system does, many either track the federal language or have similar
broad language that authorizes judges to consider a variety of mitigation.97
So the potential categories of mitigation are very broad. One naturally
wonders: do the Guidelines render mitigation relatively unimportant, even
after Booker? If mitigation is important, are there particular types of
mitigating arguments that are more effective than others?
Surprisingly, little scholarly work has focused on these questions.
Instead, the sentencing scholarship has focused primarily on the merits and

96

BOBBY SCOTT & JASON LEWIS, THE SAFE, ACCOUNTABLE, FAIR, AND EFFECTIVE (SAFE) JUSTICE
ACT, https://bobbyscott.house.gov/sites/bobbyscott.house.gov/files/SAFE%20Justice%20Act%20Fact%
20Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8RN-LQF7]; see also The Biden Plan for Strengthening America’s
Commitment to Justice, JOEBIDEN.COM, https://joebiden.com/justice/ [https://perma.cc/BRB6-VN7W]
(endorsing the SAFE Justice Act). Other policy initiatives indicating this shifting view are also worth
noting, such as President Obama’s Clemency Initiative, which served largely as an individualized
resentencing process. Obama Administration Clemency Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.
justice.gov/archives/pardon/obama-administration-clemency-initiative [https://perma.cc/CU4Y-HNFU].
Other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom, have explicitly recognized ethnic disparities in
sentencing and instructed judges to consider those potential disparities. See Sentencing Guidelines for
Firearms Offences Published, SENT’G COUNCIL (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/
news/item/sentencing-guidelines-for-firearms-offences-published/ [https://perma.cc/SC8P-VL4Z].
97 E.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606 (2021) (tracking majority of federal language); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:44-la(1)–(2) (West 2021) (providing a broad list of factors to consider including the “nature and
circumstances of the offense” and various defendant characteristics); CAL. R. CT. 4.421(c), 4.423(c)
(providing a list of sentencing factors and permitting judges to consider “[a]ny other factors . . . that
reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was committed”); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 16-90-804(c)(9) (2021) (providing a catchall authorization to depart from the guideline
range for “[a]ny other compelling reason”); ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155 (2020) (outlining an extensive
list of more than fifty potential aggravating and mitigating factors).
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problems of the Guideline system, 98 statutory mandatory sentences, 99
theories of punishment underlying sentencing generally,100 and constitutional
considerations in sentencing.101 Mitigation has been a greater focus of the
literature in the capital sentencing context.102 But capital sentencing involves
an entirely different array of procedures than sentencing in felony cases.
Juries—rather than judges—control the sentencing phase of capital cases,
and the Constitution requires that they “must be able to give meaningful
consideration and effect to all mitigating evidence that might provide a basis
for refusing to impose the death penalty on a particular individual.”103 As a
result, enormous resources are typically devoted to the mitigation process in
capital cases.104 Moreover, capital cases compose only a tiny fraction of all
criminal cases.105 If we want to learn about how mitigation works in the vast
majority of criminal cases, we need to look outside the death penalty context.
There is a small literature that has taken a first step toward exploring
mitigation in noncapital cases by identifying prominent categories of

98

E.g., Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises upon Which
They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 8–31 (1988) (explaining the compromises in the Guidelines and the
structural reasons that lead to them).
99 E.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Categorical Mistakes: The Flawed Framework of the Armed Career
Criminal Act and Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 133 HARV. L. REV. 200, 201–02 (2019) (explaining
how “imprecise” mandatory minimum sentence regimes have inadvertently swept up many noncareer
criminals).
100 E.g., Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 CRIME & JUST. 1, 1 (2006)
(explaining the variance in U.S. sentencing policy throughout the past 120 years due to the popularity of
different theories of punishment).
101 E.g., William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 781,
781 (2006) (arguing that central problems in sentencing are “more the consequences of constitutional
regulation than justifications for it”).
102 E.g., Emily Hughes, Arbitrary Death: An Empirical Study of Mitigation, 89 WASH. U. L. REV.
581, 583 (2012) (presenting empirical research suggesting that methods used to collect mitigation
evidence and present it to juries are deeply flawed); Craig Haney, Evolving Standards of Decency:
Advancing the Nature and Logic of Capital Mitigation, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 835, 835–37 (2008)
(juxtaposing the lack of mitigation evidence in three pivotal death penalty cases in the last half century
with the Supreme Court’s advancing understanding of the nature and centrality of capital mitigation);
Scott E. Sundby, The Lockett Paradox: Reconciling Guided Discretion and Unguided Mitigation in
Capital Sentencing, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1147, 1150 (1991) (examining Lockett’s requirement that the
sentencer be allowed to consider all mitigating evidence calling for a sentence less than death, Justice
Antonin Scalia’s argument for overruling Lockett in Walton v. Arizona, and the Court’s recent cases
involving Lockett issues).
103 Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 246 (2007).
104 See Hughes, supra note 102, at 608–27 (providing interview data on capital mitigation specialists’
experiences).
105 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1070
(2009).
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mitigating factors.106 The most recent and comprehensive of these studies—
conducted by Carissa Hessick and Douglas Berman—attempted to identify
“consensus” mitigating factors across jurisdictions by surveying state and
federal sentencing rules and examining judge and layperson intuition about
mitigation.107 They concluded that eight mitigating factors were endorsed as
relevant by all of their sources, placing those as “consensus” factors that may
be more relevant than other potential factors.108 Those factors were (1) an
imperfect defense—which included justifications for the crime such as
duress, diminished capacity, or provocation; (2) the role of others in the
offense; (3) providing compensation to victims; (4) the amount of harm
caused by the defendant; (5) the defendant’s culpability based on factors
such as limited mens rea, age, or cognitive impairment; (6) the likelihood of
recidivism; (7) remorse; and (8) collateral consequences that the defendant
or his family would suffer as a result of punishment.109
Other scholars have identified overlapping—though not identical—
potential mitigating factors. Paul Robinson, Sean Jackowitz, and Daniel
Bartels identified a series of “extralegal punishment factors”—mitigating
factors other than those related to the harm of the offense or the extent of the
individuals’ involvement in the offense.110 They outlined four categories of
mitigation: (1) the offender’s reaction to the offense—which included the
acknowledgement of guilt and remorse; (2) the victim’s or public’s reaction
to the offense—which included the victim’s forgiveness or demand for
punishment; (3) the offender’s status, such as good or bad character, or
special contributions to society; and (4) suffering apart from the punishment
itself, such as collateral consequences suffered by the offender or his
family.111
The most formalized list of factors comes from a series of policy
statements in Chapters 5H and 5K of the Guidelines: age; education and
vocational skills; mental and emotional conditions; physical condition,
See, e.g., Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 185–201 (identifying “consensus” mitigating
factors); Paul H. Robinson, Sean E. Jackowitz & Daniel M. Bartels, Extralegal Punishment Factors: A
Study of Forgiveness, Hardship, Good Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors
in Assessing Criminal Punishment, 65 VAND. L. REV. 737, 740–42 (2012) (discussing eighteen
“extralegal punishment factors” influencing sentencing); MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT
SENTENCING (Julian V. Roberts ed., 2011) (discussing mitigation from several angles, but focusing
primarily on the United Kingdom); Miriam S. Gohara, Grace Notes: A Case for Making Mitigation the
Heart of Noncapital Sentencing, 41 AM. J. CRIM. L. 41, 65–70 (2013) (discussing common mitigating
factors in capital cases and arguing for their use in noncapital settings).
107 Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 185–87.
108 Id. at 187.
109 Id. at 188–201.
110 Robinson et al., supra note 106, at 740–41.
111 Id. at 743–66.
106

1416

116:1395 (2022)

Modern Sentencing Mitigation

including drug or alcohol dependence; employment record; family ties and
responsibilities; role in the offense; criminal history; dependence on criminal
activity for a livelihood; prior military service; lack of guidance as a youth
and similar circumstances; substantial assistance given to authorities; victim
contribution to the offense; commission of the offense to avoid a perceived
greater harm; coercion and duress; diminished capacity; voluntary disclosure
of the offense; and aberrant behavior. 112 While the Guidelines function
largely to restrict these factors as considerations for a Guidelines
departure,113 they provide a good starting point for factors that a judge might
consider in deciding whether to grant a downward variance below the
Guideline range.
These sources identify a wide array of potential mitigating factors. But
they can be organized. Most broadly, they all fall under one of the two
sentencing factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1): they either mitigate
based on the “nature and circumstances of the offense” or the “history and
characteristics of the defendant.”114 The former category is offense focused
and independent of the person who committed the offense. Factors described
by Hessick and Berman such as the role of others in the offense and the harm
caused by the defendant fit in this category.115 I term this type of mitigation
“offense mitigation.”
The latter category, in contrast, is independent of the offense and
instead assesses the defendant as a person. Factors described by Hessick and
Berman such as the defendant’s personal characteristics that are relevant to
culpability, collateral consequences, and physical or mental challenges fall
into this category. Likewise, most of Robinson and his coauthors’ “extralegal
punishment factors,” as well as most of the mitigating factors outlined in the
Guidelines, focus on the offender’s personal characteristics. I term this type
of mitigation “personal mitigation” because the focus is on the individual
person rather than the offense.116
*

112

*

*

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 5H1.1–.12, 5K2.10–.13, .16, .20 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N

2021).
113

See supra notes 76–81 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Berman, supra note 67, at 277–78 (dividing sentencing considerations between “offense
conduct and offender characteristics”); CAL. R. CT. 4.421, 4.423 (separating aggravating and mitigating
factors into “factors relating to the crime” and “factors relating to the defendant”).
115 Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 191–95.
116 I am not the first to use this term. See, e.g., Joanna Shapland, Personal Mitigation and
Assumptions About Offending and Desistance, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING,
supra note 106, at 60.
114
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In Section I.B, we learned that there is a vast amount of information
that a judge may consider as mitigation at sentencing in routine felony cases.
And we have identified some of the potential mitigating categories that they
might consider. But this does not answer our key questions: Is mitigation
actually important to sentencing, in spite of the Guidelines? In what ways?
And if it is, are there ways we can improve our rules and procedures to get
the most relevant information to sentencing decisionmakers?
There are two ways we might be able to answer those questions. The
first is to directly study mitigation in real criminal cases by examining
mitigating arguments made by attorneys—either at sentencing or in
sentencing memoranda—and statistically test whether certain mitigating
arguments are associated with changes in sentences. In this Article, I report
the results of the first such study in American cases.117 But there is a second
way, which has been explored in a small literature: indirectly measuring the
effects of mitigation through surveys and experiments. In the next Part, I
explore those studies.
II. SURVEY AND EXPERIMENTAL DATA ON MITIGATION
A. Judicial Surveys
Perhaps the simplest way to understand what factors judges consider
most relevant to sentencing is to simply ask. That was the idea behind a largescale survey of federal district judges conducted by the Sentencing
Commission in 2010.118 The commission contacted 942 federal judges and
surveyed them via email on a number of topics, including the relevance of
each of twenty-six mitigating factors outlined in Chapters 5H and 5K of the
Guidelines.119 Judges were presented with each potential mitigating factor
and asked to indicate whether the factor was “Ordinarily Relevant” or
“Never Relevant” to determinations of whether to grant a variance or
departure.120 Four factors—all related to the mental or physical health of the
defendant—were seen as among the most relevant to departure and variance
considerations: mental condition, emotional condition, physical condition,

117

See infra Parts III–V.
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, RESULTS OF SURVEY OF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGES JANUARY 2010
THROUGH MARCH 2010, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2010 JUDGES SURVEY].
119 Id. at 2–4, tbl.13. The factors were entirely derived from the Guidelines’ policy statements
described supra note 112.
120 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2010 JUDGES SURVEY, supra note 118, at 2–4, tbl.13. Judges’ responses
to the two questions—relevance to a within-range determination and relevance to a variance or
departure—were largely correlated. See id.
118

1418

116:1395 (2022)

Modern Sentencing Mitigation

and diminished capacity. 121 Indeed, mental condition and diminished
capacity were viewed as the two most relevant factors, rated by 79% and
80% of judges, respectively, to be ordinarily relevant mitigators.122
Just below that, about 75% of judges indicated that two mitigating
factors related to remorse were typically relevant to variance or departure
considerations: voluntary disclosure of the offense and exceptional efforts to
fulfill restitution obligations.123 Importantly, both of those mitigating factors
provide concrete evidence of remorse by showing that the defendant took
steps to correct the harms caused by the crime. Those were closely followed
by a number of mitigating factors indicating the defendant’s good character
despite the crime committed: that the crime was aberrant behavior (74% of
judges considered relevant); the defendant’s employment record (65%);
stress related to military service (64%); prior good works (62%); and civic,
charitable, or public service (60%).124 Last, the majority of judges found that
the defendant’s age (67%) and family ties and responsibilities (62%) were
typically relevant to the variance or departure decision.125
Some other factors stood in contrast. Notably, the majority of judges
did not find that prior trauma or disadvantages were typically relevant: lack
of guidance as a youth (49% of judges considered relevant) and having a
disadvantaged upbringing (50%) were less favored. 126 Likewise, judges
considered certain addictions, such as drug or alcohol dependence and
gambling addictions, less relevant (49%, 47%, and 39%, respectively).127
While the 2010 survey is the most recent and comprehensive
examination into federal judges’ views on mitigation, two other surveys
warrant brief mention. First, in 2003 (prior to Booker) the Sentencing
Commission conducted a similar survey of federal judges’ general views on
the Guidelines. 128 In one open-ended question asking judges to state
challenges to the Guidelines, the single most given answer was judicial
discretion, with respondents feeling that “the sentencing Judge should be
121 Id. One caveat to the results of the 2010 survey is worth mentioning here: the Commission
reported the survey results but did not conduct any statistical testing to determine whether differences
between groups were statistically significant. See id. at 2–4.
122 Id. tbl.13. Emotional condition was considered relevant by 60% of judges, and physical condition
by 64%. Id.
123 Id.; see also Rocksheng Zhong, Judging Remorse, 39 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 133, 148
(2015) (noting that judges who believed remorse to be legally relevant in criminal justice thought “it was
pertinent primarily at arraignment and sentencing”).
124 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2010 JUDGES SURVEY, supra note 118, tbl.13.
125 Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, SURVEY OF ARTICLE III JUDGES ON THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES, at ES-1 (2003).
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given more opportunity to take into account the personal characteristics of
the defendants.”129 This mirrored the results of the 2010 survey in which
judges indicated that many defendants’ personal characteristics were
ordinarily relevant in sentencing. 130 Likewise, the 2003 survey included
questions about whether a number of the potentially mitigating
characteristics outlined in Chapters 5H and 5K of the Guidelines should have
been given more or less emphasis.131 Similar to the results of the 2010 survey,
over 60% of judges said that mental condition should be given greater
emphasis—higher than any other category.132 Other results tended to align
with judges’ responses in the 2010 survey as well: 59% of judges said that
family ties or responsibilities should be given greater weight, and at least
45% of judges responded that age, employment record, prior good works,
and emotional conditions also stood out as categories that should be given
greater emphasis.133
Second, in 2014, Federal District Judge Mark Bennett and Ira Robbins
conducted a survey of federal judges, asking them a variety of questions
about the impact of allocution—in-person sentencing arguments at the
sentencing hearing. 134 Though the questions in the survey were relatively
broad—and in some cases open-ended—judges ranked “genuine remorse”
as the most important factor, along with character-related arguments, such
as demonstrating concrete post-incarceration plans.135 Importantly, though,
the survey did not directly ask about the impact of health- or addictionrelated evidence during allocution, unlike the Sentencing Commission
surveys.136
129 Id. at III-24. I note that this response was given by circuit judges rather than district court judges.
Id. Notably, when the same question was presented to district court judges, their second-most-given
answer was judicial discretion. This response trailed closely behind the most given answer, drug policy.
Id. at II-25.
130 See supra notes 121–127 and accompanying text.
131 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 128, at B-8.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Mark W. Bennett & Ira P. Robbins, Last Words: A Survey and Analysis of Federal Judges’ Views
on Allocution in Sentencing, 65 ALA. L. REV. 735, 745–47 (2014).
135 Id. at 752–53.
136 Id. at 793–94 tbls.18a & 18b. One other notable survey, conducted by Stephen Garvey as part of
the Capital Juror project, surveyed jurors in capital cases, asking them how various aggravating and
mitigating factors influenced their likelihood to vote for a death sentence. Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation
and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do Jurors Think?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1540–41 (1998). In
line with the Sentencing Commission surveys, health-related mitigation, such as mental disabilities or
other diminished capacity, was reported as the strongest mitigating factor after lingering doubt over the
defendant’s guilt. Id. at 1559 tbl.4, 1564–65. Childhood trauma and other unfortunate circumstances for
the defendant also tended to mitigate, as did youthfulness at the time of the crime. Id. I also note one U.K.
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In sum, the judicial surveys imply that several potential mitigating
factors are especially relevant to judges: defendants’ health (especially
mental health), indicators of the defendant’s remorse, indicators of good
character, family ties (which could indicate that the family would suffer
collateral consequences from punishment), and age. In contrast, historical
indicators of a defendant’s disadvantage—such as a traumatic upbringing—
may be less relevant.
B. Experimental Studies on Mitigation
The second way to examine the relative importance of mitigating
factors is to test them experimentally by presenting participants with
vignettes about crimes and offenders, manipulating the extent and type of
mitigation and observing effects on sentences. There are some advantages to
this method: while artificial, it allows researchers to tightly control and
isolate the type of mitigation presented, allowing conclusions about cause
and effect, rather than just correlation.
Though there have been a number of such studies, a few are particularly
relevant to the questions addressed here. One of the most recent—and
perhaps the most comprehensive—was conducted by Robinson, Jackowitz,
and Bartels. Robinson and his coauthors provided lay participants with five
vignettes—“each describing the circumstances of a hypothetical criminal
offense”—and asked the participants to determine how much punishment the
offender deserved for his crimes. 137 The participants first read baseline
scenarios—in which no mitigating or aggravating facts were present—and
assigned sentences.138 Then, the participants read the same vignettes, some
with mitigating facts included, and were asked whether the new facts
influenced their sentences.139
Because of the number of factors tested (eighteen) across five separate
crime vignettes,140 the results were complex, but three broad trends emerged.
First, mitigation related to “true remorse,” when the defendant has expressed

study that straddled the line between a survey and observational research about mitigation. Jessica
Jacobson and Mike Hough observed over 100 sentencings in U.K. courts and attempted to categorize
mitigating factors that were raised by either the prosecution or defense in their arguments or by the judge
in pronouncing sentence. See Jessica Jacobson & Mike Hough, Personal Mitigation: An Empirical
Analysis in England and Wales, in MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING, supra note 106, at
146, 146–50. They also attempted to code for whether the mitigation had an impact on sentencing based
on the qualitative wording of the argument and judges’ statements, concluding that personal mitigation
was critical to a number of reduced sentences. Id. at 148–52.
137 Robinson et al., supra note 106, at 774–75.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 774–78.
140 Id. at 774–75, 777–78.
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presumptively valid remorse or demonstrated remorse by providing
compensation to victims, caused the greatest reductions in sentences. 141
Interestingly, however, similar mitigation when the defendant’s sincerity
was not supported by action—such as a mere acknowledgement of guilt or
simple apology to victims—did not cause similar reductions. 142 Second,
indicators of collateral consequences—for example, that the defendant’s
family would suffer punishment as a result of incarceration—were the
second-most-powerful mitigators. 143 Third, indicators of character
independent of the crime—such as good or bad deeds done by the defendant,
or the defendant’s special talents—had very little impact.144
The results reported by Robinson and his coauthors largely mirror the
results of the Sentencing Commission’s surveys, indicating that remorse and
collateral consequences are potentially powerful mitigators.145 They diverge,
however, on the issue of character. Judges reported character to be among
the most important kinds of personal mitigation, yet laypeople in the study
by Robinson and his coauthors found it only minimally mitigating. Also,
notably, the judicial surveys indicate that judges find health—especially
mental health—to be a critical factor in sentencing, but the Robinson study
did not evaluate that potential mitigator.
One recent study, by Colleen Berryessa, focused exclusively on mental
health mitigation.146 As in the Robinson study, participants were presented
with vignettes of committed crimes and asked to assign an appropriate prison
term.147 Some participants were told that a psychiatrist had diagnosed the
defendant with one of several psychiatric illnesses, and others were further
told that the illness had particular biological bases.148 The presence of several
of the psychiatric illnesses significantly decreased the amount of punishment

141

Id. at 782–83 tbls.5 & 6.
Id.
143 Id. Others have found similar results. See, e.g., William Austin, The Concept of Desert and Its
Influence on Simulated Decision Makers’ Sentencing Decisions, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 163, 181–85
(1979) (measuring the effects of collateral consequences on punishment).
144 Robinson et al., supra note 106, at 782–83 tbls.5 & 6.
145 Robinson and his coauthors did not find strong effects of age as a mitigator. Id. But other studies
have. See, e.g., Christine E. Bergeron & Stuart J. McKelvie, Effects of Defendant Age on Severity of
Punishment for Different Crimes, 144 J. SOC. PSYCH. 75, 86–87 (2004) (finding reduced punishment for
both old and young offenders as compared to middle-aged offenders).
146 Colleen M. Berryessa, The Effects of Psychiatric and “Biological” Labels on Lay Sentencing and
Punishment Decisions, 14 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY 241, 252–54 (2018). Of course, the presence
of a biological basis was not mitigating across all illnesses. Id. at 253. Nevertheless, the author concluded
that the “data do support some experiments on lay sentencing views reporting that biological explanations
for psychiatric illnesses can mitigate perceptions of dangerousness and endorsed prison time.” Id. at 254.
147 Id. at 244–45.
148 Id. at 244.
142
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that participants assigned to the offender, and that reduction was more
pronounced for two of the illnesses when participants were told that it had a
biological basis. 149 While the results varied by illness, they imply that
laypeople may judge individuals to be less culpable for their crimes when
knowing they suffer from illnesses that affect their judgment, especially
when those illnesses are thought of as biological.150
Both the judicial surveys and the Robinson study indicate that true
remorse may be a powerful mitigating factor as well. 151 While there are
limited studies directly examining the impact of remorse on specific
sentencing decisions, there is a significant psychological literature showing
that expressions of true remorse following a crime tend to reduce laypeople’s
view of the offender’s blameworthiness.152 However, at least one study has
indicated that bare emotional expressions of remorse—without any evidence
to support them—are not mitigating.153
The story is more mixed on character as a mitigator: the judicial surveys
indicate that it is among the most relevant individual characteristics for
sentencing, but it was one of the least mitigating factors in the Robinson
study. Generally, the psychological literature implies that character
mitigation should have at least some influence on sentencing. A number of
studies have found that individuals with high “social attractiveness”—
likeability that is generally associated with good character—are blamed less
for criminal conduct. For example, one prominent study presented
participants with vignettes in which a person did a bad act (such as throwing
a punch in a fight or driving carelessly, resulting in an accident).154 When the
participants were told that the person had done good acts earlier in the day
(such as being polite, acting honestly, or helping others), the person was seen
149

Id. at 247–48 tbls.1 & 2.
Berryessa’s data are also in line with prior similar research. See, e.g., Lisa G. Aspinwall, Teneille
R. Brown & James Tabery, The Double-Edged Sword: Does Biomechanism Increase or Decrease Judges’
Sentencing of Psychopaths?, 337 SCIENCE 846, 847 (2012) (finding that evidence that a defendant’s
psychopathy had a biological basis was mitigating); Michelle E. Barnett, Stanley L. Brodsky & Cali
Manning Davis, When Mitigation Evidence Makes a Difference: Effects of Psychological Mitigating
Evidence on Sentencing Decisions in Capital Trials, 22 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 751, 764 (2004) (conducting a
similar vignette experiment, and finding that presentation of mitigating mental illness reduced the
likelihood of a death sentence by nearly half).
151 See supra notes 123, 141 and accompanying text.
152 See, e.g., Gregg J. Gold & Bernard Weiner, Remorse, Confession, Group Identity and
Expectancies About Repeating a Transgression, 22 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 291, 293–95 (2000)
(finding that when remorse was shown, participants perceived higher moral character, sympathy,
forgiveness, and absence of punishment).
153 Alayna Jehle, Monica K. Miller & Markus Kemmelmeier, The Influence of Accounts and
Remorse on Mock Jurors’ Judgments of Offenders, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 393, 396–401 (2009).
154 Mark D. Alicke & Ethan Zell, Social Attractiveness and Blame, 39 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 2089,
2093–2100 (2009).
150
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as less blameworthy for the later bad act, and in some cases, less causally
responsible for it. 155 Other studies have found similar results. 156 Based on
these studies, one would anticipate that criminal defendants who
demonstrate social attractiveness—by providing evidence of good works
they did before committing their crime, for example—would be viewed as
less blameworthy by judges, and thus receive more lenient sentences.
*

*

*

Part I gave us a background of the potential universe of mitigating
factors that could be considered at sentencing. Now, in Part II, we have
learned a bit about how those factors might compare—which ones we expect
to be the most mitigating at sentencing.
But while these studies provide models of how we expect mitigation to
work, they cannot fully tell us how mitigation works in practice for several
reasons. First, as with most survey or laboratory methodologies, they are
artificial, and lack the richness of real-world scenarios. Judges in real cases
have to balance many types of mitigation against a host of other
considerations—a process not modeled in these studies. Second, judges’
self-reports of what they consider mitigating may not align with their actual
behavior.157 Third, all of the experiments described above used laypeople,
rather than judges, as subjects, and thus do not capture the judge’s unique
position as a repeat player in sentencing. And fourth, none of the experiments
accounted for the Guidelines’ minimization of mitigation, which could serve
to blunt its effects. To more completely understand how mitigation
influences decisions, we need to examine the rich context of real cases. In
the next Part, I describe the methods I used to empirically measure mitigation
presented in over 300 felony cases: by coding sentencing memoranda filed
by defense attorneys for over a dozen categories of mitigation and

155

Id. at 2095–96, 2100.
See, e.g., Nona J. Barnett & Hubert S. Feild, Character of the Defendant and Length of Sentence
in Rape and Burglary Crimes, 104 J. SOC. PSYCH. 271, 275 (1978) (finding the social attractiveness of a
defendant can decrease mock jurors’ sentences “depending upon the nature of the crime”); Harold Sigall
& David Landy, Effects of the Defendant’s Character and Suffering on Juridic Judgment: A Replication
and Clarification, 88 J. SOC. PSYCH. 149, 150 (1972) (finding that socially attractive defendants are
viewed more positively and receive shorter sentences than socially unattractive defendants).
157 See, e.g., Barbara O’Brien, Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Ask and What Shall Ye
Receive? A Guide for Using and Interpreting What Jurors Tell Us, 14 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 201,
204–07 (2011) (describing problems with using subjective self-report data in the jury context); Robert E.
Kraut & Steven H. Lewis, Person Perception and Self-Awareness: Knowledge of Influences on One’s
Own Judgments, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH. 448, 450–60 (1982) (noting that judges’ self-reports
are only moderately accurate at estimating actual influences on their judgments).
156
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statistically testing how the mitigation arguments predict sentencing
decisions.
III. METHOD
A. Identifying Categories of Mitigation
I sought to categorize mitigation both with specificity—that is,
separating between categories of mitigation that are qualitatively different,
such as mitigation based on a defendant’s health concerns or mitigation
based on a defendant’s character—and also with reliability—that is, ensuring
the measurement of a particular category of mitigation is repeatable, such
that multiple observers agree on the coding.
To achieve both of those goals, before collecting any data, I examined
three groups of sources to identify potential mitigating factors: (1) the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines and the federal sentencing statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a); (2) generally accepted categories of mitigation outlined in the
prior literature; 158 and (3) a pilot sample of fifty federal sentencing
memoranda.
From those sources, three broad categories of mitigation emerged. The
first two categories—under which most mitigation falls—track the first and
most important sentencing factor under § 3553(a): “the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the
defendant.” 159 I divided that factor into two categories. First, offense
mitigation relates to the “nature and circumstances of the offense,” capturing
mitigating arguments based on how culpable the defendant is for the crime
itself.160 Second, personal mitigation relates to the defendant as a person and
how his “history and characteristics” affect his culpability.161 Under each of
those categories, I coded for separate mitigating arguments, described in
detail below.
In the pilot sample of cases I reviewed, defense attorneys spent most of
their memoranda discussing offense mitigation and personal mitigation. This
should not be surprising—nearly all mitigation outlined in the sentencing
literature is captured by those two categories, and § 3553(a)(1) tends to be
considered the broadest and most important sentencing factor. But the
sentencing memoranda also contained a third type of discussion related to
158 The most comprehensive sources on this—and the ones on which I primarily relied—were
Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, and Robinson et al., supra note 106. But there were others as well.
See, e.g., Shapland, supra note 116, at 68 (listing factors).
159 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1).
160 See infra notes 164–176 and accompanying text.
161 See infra notes 179–205 and accompanying text.
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the theory of punishment underlying the sentence. In such theories-ofpunishment discussions, attorneys make arguments about why the offense
and personal mitigation should affect the sentence, including the need to
deter, incapacitate, and rehabilitate.162
After identifying the categories of mitigation, I constructed a coding
rubric, outlining in detail the characteristics of each mitigating factor, how
the factors should be coded, and providing examples to promote reliability.163
I describe each of the mitigating factors below and summarize them in Table
1.
TABLE 1: MITIGATION FACTORS AND CATEGORIES
Mitigating Factor
Relative Seriousness
Relative Culpability
Victim Harm—Minimizing
Victim Harm—Acknowledging
Remorse—Supported

Category

Offense

Remorse—Unsupported
Historical Trauma
Character
General Family and Social Background
Collateral Consequences
Health—Supported

Personal

Health—Unsupported
Age
Deterrence
Incapacitation

Theories of Punishment

Rehabilitation

1.

Offense Mitigation

a. Relative seriousness
General facts about the scope, significance, and seriousness of the
offense itself often dominate sentencing. In calculating an offense level for
each crime, the Sentencing Guidelines focus heavily on characteristics
162 See Defendant’s Sentencing Position at 7–9, United States v. Faal, No. 15-00028 (D. Minn. Apr.
27, 2016) [hereinafter Faal Sentencing Memo]; Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum at 7–9, United
States v. Gonzalez Martinez, No. 18-CR-20008-002 (W.D. Ark. Mar. 26, 2019) [hereinafter Gonzalez
Martinez Sentencing Memo].
163 The coding rubric is on file with the author.
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defining how dangerous, broad in scope, or otherwise serious the offense
was. 164 The federal sentencing statute likewise directs judges to broadly
consider “the nature and circumstances of the offense” and “the need for the
sentence imposed . . . to reflect the seriousness of the offense.” 165
Unsurprisingly, then, defense attorneys in the pilot memoranda focused
heavily on attempting to mitigate the facts of the offense itself—arguing that
the characteristics of the offense were not as serious as the Guidelines reflect,
rendering the defendant less culpable and warranting a reduced sentence.166
Others have identified this category as significant for mitigation as well: in
Hessick and Berman’s taxonomy, it falls under “Harm Caused by the
Defendant.”167
This is a broad category that covers a number of different arguments.
For example, attorneys may argue that the Guidelines themselves overstate
the seriousness of the offense, that the specific characteristics of the crime
made it less harmful to society at large, or that aspects of the investigation
were improper. When making this type of mitigating argument, attorneys
often describe the circumstances of the offense and contrast those
circumstances with other offenses of a similar nature. Likewise, this category
also captures general descriptions of the offense that do not fit within the
other offense mitigation categories. Though these passages are often more
descriptive than argumentative, they are typically intertwined with
arguments about the relative seriousness of the offense.
b. Relative culpability
Attorneys also often seek to minimize the defendant’s particular role
within the offense itself as compared to others—either codefendants, others
involved but not charged, or others involved in similar offenses. While the
Sentencing Guidelines in part account for this by either raising the range for
a leadership role under § 3B1.1 or lowering the range for a minimal role
under § 3B1.2, attorneys also often argue that a defendant’s minimal role in
the offense should adjust his sentence downward to a greater extent than
164 For example, the fraud Guideline determines the offense level based on offense characteristics
such as the monetary amount of loss, number of victims, and the sophistication of the scheme. See U.S.
SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)–(2), (10) (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
165 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(A).
166 See Gonzalez Martinez Sentencing Memo, supra note 162, at 4–5; Defendant’s Sentencing
Memorandum at 2, United States v. Conway, No. 18-CR-183 (N.D. Ill. June 12, 2019) [hereinafter
Conway Sentencing Memo]; Sentencing Memorandum at 8, United States v. Jones, No. 17-CR-456 (N.D.
Ohio May 8, 2018) [hereinafter Jones Sentencing Memo].
167 See Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 194–95. Some of the state statutes identified by Hessick
and Berman covered broad mitigating factors accounting for the relative seriousness of the offense. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.155(d)(9) (2020) (“[T]he conduct constituting the offense was among the
least serious conduct included in the definition of the offense . . . .”).
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what is captured by the Guidelines. The federal sentencing statute also
instructs judges to “avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar
conduct.”168 This project coded arguments about that sentencing factor as
relative culpability, because the argument centers on comparisons with
others who have committed the same or similar offenses. Relative culpability
arguments were common in the pilot memoranda, and the factor was
captured in Hessick and Berman’s review as the “Role of Others in the
Defendant’s Crime.”169
c. Victim harm (minimizing or acknowledging)
Defense attorneys also sometimes seek to mitigate the characteristics of
the offense by highlighting that the defendant caused either minimal harm to
victims or less harm to victims than in other violations of the same statute.
This category is related to relative seriousness, but while that category
captures arguments about the general nature of the offense, this one captures
arguments specific to direct victim harm. Hessick and Berman found that a
number of states identify minimal harm caused to victims as a mitigating
circumstance, and they included it under their “Harm Caused by the
Defendant” consensus factor.170 The factor may be especially important in
federal cases, which involve individual victims less frequently than state
cases, rendering victim harm more unique and potentially more damaging to
defendants.171
Interestingly, defense attorneys in the pilot memoranda approached
victim harm in one of two ways: either by arguing that the victim harm was
minimal or by explicitly acknowledging and accepting that the defendant
harmed victims. The coding scheme categorized those two categories of
victim-related mitigation separately.

168

18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).
Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 191–93. I note that Hessick and Berman’s category is
broader than mine—theirs also includes victim wrongdoing, which is a mitigating factor in many state
statutes. Id. Victim-wrongdoing mitigation is likely more common in state cases than federal ones since
most violent crimes are prosecuted by the state. See Wendy Sawyer & Peter Wagner, Mass Incarceration:
The Whole Pie 2020, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/
reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/D3M4-3LEG] (showing that, in 2020, well over half of state
prisoners were incarcerated for violent crimes, while only 13,000 of 226,000—about 6%—of federal
prisoners were incarcerated for violent crimes). I did not observe arguments about victim wrongdoing in
any of the pilot sentencing memoranda that I reviewed, so I did not include it in this category.
170 Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 194–95; see, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 19-2521(2)(a) (2021)
(“The defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened harm . . . .”); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/5-5-3.1(a)(1) (2022) (“The defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened serious physical
harm to another.”).
171 See Sawyer & Wagner, supra note 169.
169
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d. Remorse (supported or unsupported)
A defendant’s remorse is one of the most prominent mitigating factors
in the prior literature.172 Robinson and his coauthors focused heavily on it in
their experiments, splitting remorse into separate categories of “True
Remorse”—sincere contrition for the offense—acknowledgement of guilt,
and apology. 173 The judicial surveys identified actions associated with
remorse—voluntary disclosure of the offense and efforts to make victims
whole—as powerful mitigators as well. 174 Likewise, Hessick and Berman
identified making victims whole as a consensus mitigating factor. 175
Unsurprisingly, expressions of remorse were common as mitigation in the
pilot sentencing memoranda as well.
Remorse is somewhat unique among the other categories of offense
mitigation in that judges are placed in a difficult position of judging the
genuineness of remorse. Nearly every defendant expresses some statement
of remorse prior to sentencing. The Robinson study modeled this at least in
part—one of their remorse categories, true remorse, presumed that the
remorse was legitimate, whereas the other remorse categories did not, which
led to a difference in the effectiveness of remorse as a mitigator.176
To reflect that difference in this study, this project coded expressions of
remorse into two separate categories based on objective criteria: one in
which the defendant presented supporting evidence—such as specific acts
relating to the offense that indicate contrition—and one in which the
defendant simply provided an unsupported statement of remorse. To
promote reliability, only claims of remorse that contained a concrete
description of action taken by the defendant were treated as remorse with
support. Those specific steps could come in a number of ways, for example:
actions to benefit victims, aid to law enforcement, or steps the defendant has
taken to ensure he does not reoffend. But the key was specificity: vague

172 I included remorse under the umbrella of offense mitigation—rather than personal mitigation—
though it does straddle the line between the two categories. While a statement of remorse is a
characteristic of the defendant’s mental state, it is inherently connected to the offense itself, unlike the
personal mitigating factors described below. Statements of remorse typically focus on admission of the
harm that was done, regret for what the defendant did, and ways to right the wrong the defendant caused—
all of which focus on the offense itself. This is in contrast with personal mitigation, which focuses on the
defendant separately from the crime. But importantly, whether remorse is placed as offense mitigation or
personal mitigation does not materially affect the results reported below.
173 Robinson et al., supra note 106, at 743–47.
174 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2010 JUDGES SURVEY, supra note 118, tbl.13.
175 See Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 193–94.
176 See supra notes 141–142 and accompanying text. Trying to assess evidence of remorse is also
particularly important because there is potential for pernicious racial biases to creep in when judging
remorse. See M. Eve Hanan, Remorse Bias, 83 MO. L. REV. 301, 350–56 (2018).
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descriptions of the defendant’s remorse were coded as remorse that did not
contain any supporting evidence.
2.

Personal Mitigation

a. Historical trauma
One of the most common forms of personal mitigation in the pilot
memoranda was descriptions of the defendant’s unfortunate upbringing,
abuse, or other prior trauma. While the Guidelines specifically mention that
“[l]ack of guidance as a youth” should not ordinarily be a consideration for
a Guideline departure, defendants often argue that this type of mitigation
warrants a variance. 177 Because many defendants come from at-risk
communities, this type of mitigation often takes the form of describing the
defendant’s less fortunate upbringing. Indeed, in the 2010 judicial survey,
50% of judges said that they saw a “Disadvantaged Upbringing” as normally
relevant to a departure or variance consideration.178 Likewise, attorneys may
also describe trauma or other difficulties that led more directly to the
commission of the offense. This project coded any type of historical
trauma—primarily used to explain why the defendant’s difficult life resulted
in the commission of a crime—under this category. Importantly, however,
current mental or physical injury or illness were coded separately, as
described below.
b. Character
A second major category of personal mitigation is good character: good
deeds, achievements, or actions that show the judge that the defendant is
more than just the crime he committed. The Sentencing Guidelines limit the
extent to which these circumstances warrant a departure: vocational skills,
employment record, and civic service (other than military service) are
generally not considered grounds for a departure. 179 Nevertheless, judges
routinely consider these factors in determining whether to grant a variance.
This is borne out in the literature: in the 2010 survey, a number of different
character-related mitigating categories were ordinarily relevant to over 60%
of judges’ variance and departure determinations;180 Hessick and Berman’s
“Recidivism” category includes a number of mitigating factors related to

U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.12 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2010 JUDGES SURVEY, supra note 118, tbl.13.
179 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.2, .5, .11.
180 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. As with remorse, there are potential bias-based
pitfalls associated with trying to judge character. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, Character in Criminal
Justice Proceedings: Rethinking Its Role in Rules Governing Evidence, Punishment, Prosecutors, and
Parole, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 353, 370–74 (2019) (describing biases impacting character judgment).
177
178
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prior criminal history and character; 181 and Robinson and his coauthors’
“Offender Status” categories were comprised of character-related
mitigation.182 Mitigating arguments under this factor can take a variety of
forms. Defendants may argue that they have a strong work ethic and
employment history; that they engaged in prior volunteer work, helping
others, or other good deeds; or that they behaved well following arrest by
following conditions of pretrial release. In fraud cases, defendants
sometimes argue that they have not “lived a life of excess.”183 And they may
also emphasize that their criminal history is limited. While the Guidelines in
part consider this by calculating a criminal history category for each
defendant that affects the Guideline range,184 the Guidelines also recognize
that, in limited circumstances, a defendant’s criminal history category may
overrepresent his true criminal past.185 And even where that guidance does
not apply, a judge may vary from the Guideline range based on the
defendant’s limited criminal past.186
c. General family and social background
One other category of mitigation observed in the pilot sentencing
memoranda is less well described in the literature: general discussion of
defendants’ family connections and support systems. These descriptions
typically operated as a general background to humanize the defendant as a
real person with real personal connections.187 There is no clear framework
within which this type of mitigation fits. The Sentencing Guidelines provide
that “family ties and responsibilities” are not ordinarily relevant to a
departure determination,188 but 62% of judges in the 2010 survey said they
were ordinarily relevant to their departure or variance considerations.189 To
capture the limited discussion of general family and social background in the
pilot memoranda, the coding scheme limited this category to simple
181

Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 197–99.
Robinson et al., supra note 106, at 751–58.
183 E.g., Letter from Jennifer E. Willis, Assistant Fed. Def., Fed. Defs. of N.Y., to Hon. Alvin K.
Hellerstein, U.S. Dist. J., S.D.N.Y. 9 (Oct. 7, 2016) (on file with journal) (“Mr. Hunte has never lived a
life of excess or luxury. He has provided his family with a comfortable and modest life in the middle
class.”).
184 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.1, ch. 5, pt. A, introductory cmt. (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2018).
185 See id. § 4A1.3(b)(1).
186 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (permitting judges to consider “the history and characteristics of the
defendant” generally).
187 See Faal Sentencing Memo, supra note 162, at 3–4; Gonzalez Martinez Sentencing Memo, supra
note 162, at 5–6; Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum at 8, United States v. Rouswell, No. CR 17-409SVW (C.D. Cal. July 2, 2018) [hereinafter Rouswell Sentencing Memo].
188 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6.
189 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2010 JUDGES SURVEY, supra note 118, tbl.13.
182
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descriptions of the defendant’s family and social background that did not fall
in other categories, such as good character, trauma, or collateral
consequences.
d. Collateral consequences
Another common form of personal mitigation presented in sentencing
memoranda is the extent of hardship—beyond imprisonment—that the
defendant or others will suffer as a result of conviction and punishment.190
Defendants may discuss the fact that they will lose employment or the right
to vote or carry a firearm, or that the conviction will have immigration
consequences, such as deportation. Defendants may also argue that their
families will suffer as a result of their punishment because the defendant is
a provider or caregiver. As described above, the Guidelines specifically
mention that “family ties and responsibilities” are not ordinarily relevant to
a departure, 191 but mention of collateral-consequences mitigation was
common in the pilot memoranda. 192 Likewise, Hessick and Berman
identified a similar factor—“hardship”—as one of their consensus mitigating
factors;193 Robinson and his coauthors tested it as “Special Hardship from
Punishment” and “Hardship for Offender’s Family or Other Third Parties,”194
and the judicial surveys indicated that judges consider family ties—which
come with attendant collateral consequences—as often relevant.195
e. Health (supported or unsupported)
The defendant’s mental or physical health difficulty is another oftendiscussed mitigating factor. The Sentencing Guidelines provide a mixed
policy as to whether health problems can be mitigating: while “mental and
emotional conditions” and “physical condition or appearance” “may be
relevant” to a departure consideration, “drug or alcohol dependence or
abuse” is ordinarily not.196 But judges in the 2010 survey reported viewing
certain types of health mitigation—particularly mental health—as very
relevant,197 and experiments likewise imply that it is a relevant mitigator.198

190 For discussion of collateral consequences in the sentencing mitigation context, see Chin, supra
note 49, at 250–52.
191 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6.
192 See Faal Sentencing Memo, supra note 162, at 10–13; Rouswell Sentencing Memo, supra note
187, at 10; Defendant Adil Mohammed Khan’s Sentencing Memorandum at 12–13, United States v.
Khan, No. 18-CR-203-3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 28, 2020) [hereinafter Khan Sentencing Memo].
193
Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 200–01.
194 Robinson et al., supra note 106, at 760–62.
195 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2010 JUDGES SURVEY, supra note 118, tbl.13.
196 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3–4.
197 See supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text.
198 See supra notes 146–150 and accompanying text.
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These arguments can take many forms, including the presence of mental
health problems, drug addiction, or other physical ailments.
Like expressions of remorse, the data described in Part II imply that
health-related mitigation may have special significance, over and above
other categories of mitigation. And health-related mitigation is similar to
expressions of remorse in another way: it is often capable of being supported
by objective evidence, primarily in the form of medical documentation from
treating health care providers. This is distinct from other forms of personal
mitigation: in the pilot memoranda, discussion of historical trauma, character
mitigation, and family circumstances was rarely accompanied by specific
evidence. 199 But health-related mitigation can easily be supported by the
documentation it often generates. Like expressions of remorse, we might
expect that when a defendant can support his claims of health-related
mitigation with evidence, they will be more persuasive, so the coding scheme
separately coded arguments in which health-related mitigation was
supported and those in which it was not.200
Evidence can come in a variety of forms. Two common methods were
(1) reference to an attached medical report or other exhibit providing support
and (2) reference to specific paragraphs of the PSR. The scheme considered
the second form as providing support only if the reference was not confined
to the defendant’s own report of injury or illness to the probation officer. In
contrast, where a description of a defendant’s medical issue contained no
evidence, it was coded accordingly.
f. Age
Last, a defendant’s age can also be a mitigating factor of its own,
unrelated to any specific health concerns. The Guidelines explicitly account
for age as a potential mitigating factor, but only when “considerations based
on age . . . are present to an unusual degree and distinguish the case from the
typical cases covered by the guidelines.”201 Robinson and his coauthors and
Hessick and Berman also identified age as a relevant mitigating
circumstance.202 Age-based mitigating arguments were common in the pilot
memoranda, including arguments both that a defendant’s elderly status was

199

See Conway Sentencing Memo, supra note 166, at 2; Jones Sentencing Memo, supra note 166,
at 8; Defendant’s Sentencing Memorandum at 5, United States v. Howard, No. 17CR00077 (N.D. Ohio
Oct. 17, 2017).
200 See, e.g., Betsy J. Grey, Neuroscience, PTSD, and Sentencing Mitigation, 34 CARDOZO L. REV.
53, 67 (2012) (“Concerns about fraud and malingering . . . surround claims of mental disorders and
PTSD.”).
201 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1.
202 Robinson et al., supra note 106, at 763–64; Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 195–96
(describing youthful age as a component of the “defendant’s culpability” consensus factor).

1433

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

mitigating and that a defendant’s youthful age rendered him less culpable.203
Both types of arguments have support in the legal framework. The
Guidelines’ discussion of age primarily focuses on old age as a mitigator.204
And the U.S. Supreme Court has described how young criminal defendants
often have not reached full cognitive development, implying reduced
culpability for their criminal conduct.205
3. Theories-of-Punishment Discussion
Outlining offense mitigation and personal mitigation is the primary
purpose of most sentencing memoranda. But undergirding that mitigation is
discussion about why those particulars of the case warrant a lower sentence.
More succinctly, they articulate why the defendant’s suggested sentence
would satisfy the various purposes of punishment.
Notably, the Sentencing Reform Act did not adopt a single theory of
punishment. 206 Instead, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2) outlines different goals of
punishment that judges must consider in sentencing, such as deterrence,207
incapacitation, 208 and rehabilitation. 209 In the pilot memoranda, attorneys
frequently provided short, cabined discussions explicitly referencing and
discussing one or more of the § 3553(a)(2) categories.210 Thus, this project
coded for any sentencing discussion that explicitly raised any of those three
goals of punishment or cited the portions of § 3553(a) instructing the judge
to consider those goals of punishment.

203

See Sentencing Memorandum on Behalf of Sonja Emery and Request for Downward Departure
at 21, United States v. Emery, No. 18-cr-20240 (E.D. Mich. Oct. 12, 2020) [hereinafter Emery Sentencing
Memo].
204 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.1 (“Age may be a reason to depart downward in a case
in which the defendant is elderly and infirm and where a form of punishment such as home confinement
might be equally efficient . . . .”).
205 Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010); see also Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472 (2012)
(citing Supreme Court precedent emphasizing that the characteristics of youth “diminish the penological
justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders”).
206 Hessick & Berman, supra note 71, at 170–72.
207 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(B) (requiring judges to consider “the need for the sentence imposed . . .
to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct”).
208 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(C) (requiring judges to consider “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to protect
the public from further crimes of the defendant”).
209 Id. § 3553(a)(2)(D) (requiring judges to consider “the need for the sentence imposed . . . to
provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional
treatment in the most effective manner”). I note that § 3553(a)(2)(A) also instructs judges to consider the
fourth major theory of punishment—retribution—by requiring the sentence “to provide just punishment
for the offense.” I observed little discussion of this factor in the pilot memoranda, perhaps because the
notion of what sentence would provide just punishment is so subjective. Thus, I did not code for
discussion under § 3553(a)(2)(A).
210 See Gonzalez Martinez Sentencing Memo, supra note 162, at 6–11; Rouswell Sentencing Memo,
supra note 187, at 12–14; Conway Sentencing Memo, supra note 166, at 2–3.
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4. Sentencing Information
I collected two sentencing measures from each case: the total
Sentencing Guideline range applicable to the defendant’s convictions, and
the total sentence imposed for those convictions. While those figures may
seem self-explanatory, identifying them in a given case is not always simple.
The district court is required to calculate the Guideline range, and it typically
announces the range on the record at the sentencing hearing.211 Thus, if a
sentencing transcript was available, I reviewed it to identify the Guideline
range as announced by the court. Unless a case is appealed, however, a
sentencing transcript is typically not made public. In cases where a transcript
was unavailable, I consulted other portions of the record to identify the
Guideline range, such as the parties’ sentencing memoranda or the plea
agreement. 212 Identifying the sentence is more straightforward: the judge
must include it in the judgment. 213 When there were multiple counts of
conviction, I calculated the total sentence by combining sentences ordered to
be served concurrently and adding sentences to be served consecutively.214
From those data, I calculated each defendant’s sentence as a percentage of
the midpoint of the Guideline range, which served as the primary dependent
measure in most of my analyses.215 I collected sentencing information last,
after doing all other coding, to avoid any possible bias in the coding.
B. Identification and Selection of Cases
Before gathering cases to use in the sample, I first weighted each federal
judicial district to account for the fact that different districts hear different

211 See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (explaining that it is procedural error for a court
to “fail[] to calculate (or improperly calculat[e]) the Guidelines range”).
212 In seventeen cases, it was impossible to identify the Guideline range either because none of the
available documents discussed it, or—more commonly—it was disputed in the available documents and
nothing in the public record indicated how the court resolved the dispute. For examples of similar
problems from the pilot sample, see Khan Sentencing Memo, supra note 192, at 4–9; Jones Sentencing
Memo, supra note 166, at 2–6; and Emery Sentencing Memo, supra note 203, at 2–9. I removed such
cases from the sample and replaced them with other cases from the same district and year.
213 FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(k)(1).
214 That is to say, if a defendant was sentenced to 30 months’ incarceration on Count 1, 30 months’
incarceration on Count 2 to be served concurrently with Count 1, and 60 months’ incarceration on Count
3 to be served consecutively to all other counts, I would combine the two 30-month sentences and add
the 60-month sentence, for a total sentence of 90 months.
215 I also coded the primary type of crime for which the defendant was convicted. I divided crime
type into six categories: firearms, drug trafficking, child exploitation, fraud/theft, violent crime, and other.
Because I did not have specific hypotheses about crime-type effects, I did not initially conduct analyses
by crime type, but I included the measure to allow for future analyses. I also used the crime-type data as
a partial control for race effects in one of the follow-up analyses I report below. See infra notes 297–299
and accompanying text.
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numbers of criminal cases.216 Using the weighting variable to determine how
many cases to select from each district, 217 I sampled four recent years of
cases, from 2015 through 2018. I used the Lexis CourtLink system to search
all criminal cases and used a random number generator to randomly select
the correctly weighted number of criminal cases from each year and district.
I selected a large sample of just over 300 total felony cases in which a
sentencing memorandum was filed.218
Not all of the cases selected in this initial pass were suitable to
investigate mitigation because a number of case characteristics can limit the
extent to which mitigating evidence will be presented to the court or
considered in the sentence. I removed all cases with the following
characteristics, and replaced them from the same year and district using the
same random selection described above219:
•

Cases in which the government recommended that the
defendant receive a downward departure for “substantial
assistance to authorities” under U.S. Sentencing Guideline
§ 5K1.1, which can blunt the impact of other mitigation.220

216 To do this, I took data from the U.S. Courts, which tracks the total number of criminal cases filed
nationally in federal district courts, and calculated a weighting variable based on the share of all criminal
cases heard in each district between 2015 and 2018. See, e.g., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., supra
note 21, tbl.D-3, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_d3_0930.2018.pdf [https://
perma.cc/VW9Y-YXSJ] (providing an example of the caseload data produced by U.S. courts). For all
docket caseload data, see Caseload Statistics Data Tables, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/statisticsreports/caseload-statistics-data-tables [https://perma.cc/JV7W-S6V2].
217 I identified twenty districts for which sentencing memoranda were not available due to local
practices of either filing them under seal or providing them directly to the court off of the public record.
Those districts were not included in the sample. Though there was no way around this problem, not being
able to examine sealed sentencing memoranda does introduce some bias into the sample, as discussed
infra note 308 and accompanying text.
218 In total, the sample included 78 cases from 2015, 75 from 2016, 77 from 2017, and 72 from 2018.
This sample is roughly equivalent to other studies that involve the coding of legal language. See, e.g.,
Daniel M. Schneider, Empirical Research on Judicial Reasoning: Statutory Interpretation in Federal Tax
Cases, 31 N.M. L. REV. 325, 333 (2001) (noting sample size of 431 cases); Mark A. Hall & Ronald F.
Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 69–73 (2008) (collecting
and describing similar studies). The best way to select a sample size in most quantitative research is to
first conduct a power analysis, which helps to determine the probability of detecting an effect, given a
particular sample size, if a true effect exists. JACOB COHEN, STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 1, 14 (1977). But to do a power analysis, one typically needs to be able to estimate
the strength of the effect being studied based on prior research. See id. at 14–15. That was not feasible
here, given the novelty of this study.
219 This method is similar to the one taken by the Sentencing Commission in analyzing sentencing
data more broadly. See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, THE INFLUENCE OF THE GUIDELINES ON FEDERAL
SENTENCING: FEDERAL SENTENCING OUTCOMES, 2005–2017, at 14 (2020), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2020/20201214_Guidelines-InfluenceReport.pdf [https://perma.cc/JP24-DVLJ] (describing exclusions in its study).
220 I removed 17 cases from the sample on this basis.
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Cases involving plea agreements with a set, agreed-upon
sentence, eliminating the judicial discretion of interest here.221
Cases in which the top or bottom of the Guideline range was
restricted by a mandatory minimum or statutory maximum
sentence, limiting the judge’s sentencing discretion.222
Illegal reentry offenses prosecuted under 8 U.S.C. § 1326,
which tend to be sentenced under a different set of standards
and considerations than other felony cases, as convicted
individuals are often subject to ICE detention and removal from
the country in addition to federal sentencing.223
Sentences that were reversed on appeal, which are difficult to
assess because there have been multiple sentencing
proceedings.224
Cases involving an upper Guideline range of life imprisonment,
which makes it difficult to calculate the midpoint of the
range.225
Cases in which the judge gave a probationary sentence, which
makes it difficult to calculate the sentence as a proportion of
the midpoint of the Guideline range.226
C. Coding Methods and Intercoder Reliability Check

Most of the primary independent variables in this study involved counts
of the number of words an attorney spent on a particular type of mitigating
argument. All citations were coded as part of the analysis, and all footnotes
as if they were incorporated into the main text. To promote reliability, unless
a paragraph clearly contained language that fell into multiple coding
categories, single paragraphs were coded as a single category. There were,
of course, instances in which single paragraphs did have multiple categories
of discussion, but those were the exception rather than the rule.
After developing and finalizing the coding rubric on the initial 50 pilot
cases and collecting the full sample of cases, I randomly selected an
additional 15 cases using the same criteria I used to collect the full sample. I
and a second coder independently coded each of the 15 test cases to assess
221

8 cases. This relatively low number is worth noting—while prosecutors wield significant power
in determining sentence, my data suggest it is relatively rare that they explicitly dictate the sentence
through a set plea agreement. For a helpful discussion of the factors limiting prosecutors’ power to dictate
sentences through plea agreements, see Jeffrey Bellin, Reassessing Prosecutorial Power Through the
Lens of Mass Incarceration, 116 MICH. L. REV. 835, 849–50 (2018).
222 21 cases.
223 12 cases.
224 2 cases.
225 6 cases.
226 11 cases.
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the reliability of coding for each of the independent variables. 227 After
coding, I evaluated reliability using the Smith index228—calculated by taking
twice the number of agreements in a category and dividing by the sum of the
frequency that each rater used that category.229 The reliability ranged from
0.97 to 0.55 (and above 0.76 in all categories but one), averaging 0.88 across
all variables.230 In general, reliability indicators at the levels achieved here
are viewed as having either “Almost Perfect” reliability (above 0.80) or
“Substantial” reliability (between 0.61 and 0.80).231
IV. HYPOTHESES
The experimental and survey data described in Part II allow us to make
predictions about how mitigation might impact sentencing in real cases. In
this Part, I briefly describe five hypotheses based on those data.
Hypothesis 1: Increases in the amount of mitigation presented in
sentencing memoranda will be associated with lower sentences relative to
the Sentencing Guideline range.
The studies described in Part II suggest that mitigation matters when
assessing culpability. Across a broad range of experimental contexts,
laypeople asked to make sentencing decisions provide reduced sentences
when mitigating evidence is present. 232 And judges have repeatedly
responded in surveys that they frequently consider a variety of mitigating
circumstances in making sentencing decisions, even within the structure of
the Sentencing Guidelines.233 Thus, I anticipated that when defense attorneys
made mitigating arguments in sentencing memoranda, those arguments
would impact judges’ sentencing decisions. In the context of my data, I

227 A reliability check is a critical part of ensuring the validity of results from coding schemes like
this one, but legal scholars often do not conduct one. Hall & Wright, supra note 218, at 101 (reporting
that only 14% of reviewed coding projects contained reliability testing).
228 Charles P. Smith, Content Analysis and Narrative Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH
METHODS IN SOCIAL AND PERSONALITY PSYCHOLOGY 313, 325 (Harry T. Reis & Charles M. Judd eds.,
2000).
229 I accounted for whether the coders applied the measure to the same point in the text. So, for
example, if each coder coded 60 words of qualifications analysis, but only 40 of those words overlapped,
the analysis would only consider the coders as having agreed on 40 words. Thus, under the Smith index,
the reliability for such a scenario would be (40 * 2) / (60 + 60) = 0.67.
230 For the complete data, see infra Table A1.
231 See, e.g., Hall & Wright, supra note 218, at 115–16 (describing the approach to classifying
reliability measures, though noting differences in consensus on this point); J. Richard Landis & Gary G.
Koch, The Measurement of Observer Agreement for Categorical Data, 33 BIOMETRICS 159, 165 (1977)
(classifying kappa statistics between 0.61 and 0.80 as “Substantial” and between 0.81 and 1.00 as “Almost
Perfect,” though noting the arbitrary nature of these benchmarks).
232 See supra Section II.B.
233 See supra Section II.A.
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expected that judges would impose lower sentences (relative to the midpoint
of the Guideline range) as the amount of mitigation presented increased
(operationalized by the number of words devoted to mitigation in each
sentencing memorandum).
Hypothesis 2: Increases in the amount of personal mitigation will be
more strongly associated with lower sentences relative to the Sentencing
Guideline range than offense mitigation.
The Sentencing Guidelines provide little room for adjustments in
sentencing based on mitigation—especially personal mitigation. Instead,
they focus largely on aggravating factors about the offense itself, combined
with the defendant’s criminal history, to arrive at a Guideline range. Yet,
both the survey and experimental literature imply that judges consider
personal mitigation very relevant.234 Moreover, as described above, current
trends—in all three branches of government and in social reform—appear to
be pushing toward more individualized sentencing.235 Thus, I expected that
personal mitigation presented in sentencing memoranda would be more
strongly associated with reduced sentences than offense mitigation.
Hypothesis 3: Certain categories of personal mitigation—character,
collateral consequences, and especially health—will be more strongly
associated with reduced sentences than other personal mitigation factors.
The experimental data on mitigation are limited to a handful of judicial
surveys and a small literature of laboratory experiments, but we can cull
some predictions from those data. Three of the categories of personal
mitigation coded in this study—character, collateral consequences, and
health—find support in both the survey and experimental data.236
Among those mitigators, I expected that health mitigation—when
supported by evidence—would exert the strongest influence. Health
mitigation (especially mental health) was reported by judges as ordinarily
relevant to their decision to vary or depart from the Guideline range more
consistently than any other mitigating factor. 237 The experimental data
likewise show powerful effects of health mitigation.238 And health mitigation
is typically the only form of personal mitigation that is accompanied by
concrete, objective evidence in the form of reports or evaluations from health
care providers, potentially giving it more credibility than other forms of
personal mitigation.

234
235
236
237
238

See supra Part II.
See supra notes 90–96 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121–125, 141–156 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121–122, 132 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 146–150 and accompanying text.
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Hypothesis 4: Evidence-based remorse mitigation will be more
strongly associated with reduced sentences than other offense mitigation
factors.
The judicial surveys and laboratory experiments also indicate that
remorse is a strong mitigator. Both the 2010 judicial survey and the Robinson
and related studies imply that showing remorse through action, rather than
just explaining it through words, is comparatively more effective.239 Thus, I
anticipated that evidence-based remorse mitigation would be the strongest
offense mitigation factor.
Hypothesis 5: Mitigating arguments based on objective evidence will
have a greater mitigating effect on the sentence than subjective statements
from the defendant.
At sentencing, judges are often placed in the difficult position of having
to make decisions with limited evidence. Nearly all defendants express some
type of remorse, and judges have to determine whether that remorse is
genuine in deciding how to weigh it. Likewise, a defendant may claim
significant mitigating health problems or history of addiction, but the claims
will be difficult to evaluate without evidence. Some of the judicial survey
results and experiments provided at least initial data indicating that
supported remorse arguments are likely stronger than unsupported ones.240 I
expected the data here would show a similar trend, with evidence-supported
mitigation (in both categories where I measured it: remorse and health) being
more strongly associated with reduced sentences relative to the Guideline
range.
V. RESULTS
A. Characteristics of the Cases and Sentencing Memoranda
Figure 1 provides the total mean word counts for all coded variables,
with full statistics in the Appendix.241 To examine which mitigating factors
received the most attention in the sentencing memoranda, I conducted a 16
x 1 repeated measures ANOVA, comparing the means of each of the sixteen
mitigating factors.242
239

See supra notes 141–142, 151–153 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 123, 141–142 and accompanying text.
241
Infra Table A2. Because not all sentencing memoranda discussed all of the mitigating factors, the
Table also identifies the percentage of total sentencing memoranda that include each mitigating factor
(termed “frequency of use”).
242 ANOVA—standing for analysis of variance—is a statistical test that, among other uses, allows a
researcher to compare the differences between the means of two or more groups and determine whether
240
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FIGURE 1: AVERAGE WORD COUNTS OF MITIGATING FACTORS

500

0

Note. White bars represent offense mitigation, gray bars personal mitigation, and crosshatched
bars theories-of-punishment discussion.

Unsurprisingly, I found large differences in the amount of text devoted
to each factor. 243 Relative seriousness was the most prominent mitigating
argument and differed significantly from all other arguments.244 Character

those differences are statistically significant. See GLENN GAMST, LAWRENCE S. MEYERS & A.J.
GUARINO, ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE DESIGNS: A CONCEPTUAL AND COMPUTATIONAL APPROACH WITH
SPSS AND SAS § 1.1 (2008) (describing ANOVA as “a statistical technique used to evaluate the size of
the difference between sets of scores”). Here, for example, the repeated measures ANOVA allows us to
compare the differences between the mean word counts among the sixteen different mitigating factors in
the study.
243 I conducted a 16 x 1 repeated measures ANOVA to identify whether there were differences in the
number of words devoted to each mitigating category. The test was highly significant. F(15,
4515) = 77.54, p < 0.001, η = 0.205. I conducted Tukey post hoc tests to identify differences between
individual categories of mitigation.
244 All p’s < 0.01.
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was the next most frequent and also differed from all other arguments. 245
Relative culpability, historical trauma, and health (with supporting evidence)
were the third most frequent. 246 They were followed by collateral
consequences, deterrence, and rehabilitation.247 None of the other categories
averaged more than 70 words per sentencing memorandum.
Some categories were predisposed to shorter presentation, as can be
seen in the Appendix. For example, general family and social background
mitigation appeared in 38% of the memoranda but accounted for less than
60 words per memorandum. In contrast, health mitigation supported by
evidence appeared almost as often—in 35% of the memoranda—but
accounted for over 190 words per memorandum.
The mean sentence as a percentage of the midpoint of the Guideline
range across all cases was 74%, which is roughly in line with the national
average across all cases.248 There were differences in overall sentence as a
percentage of the midpoint of the Guideline range across crime types as
well. 249 The overall difference was driven largely by slightly longer
sentences in firearms cases, which had an average sentence of 85% of the
midpoint of the Guideline range. 250 There were also small differences in
sentence as a percentage of the midpoint of the Guideline range across
circuits.251 This effect was driven largely by slightly lower sentences in the
Second (average sentence of 51% of the midpoint of the Guideline range),

245

All p’s < 0.01.
The three categories differed from every other category. All p’s < 0.01. They did not differ
significantly from each other. All p’s > 0.3.
247 The three categories differed from every other category. All p’s < 0.05. They did not differ
significantly from each other. All p’s > 0.2.
248 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 219, at 21–24 (reporting federal data that, between 2014
and 2017, average sentences ranged from 24% to 21% below the bottom of the Guideline range, and
16.5% when examining only cases involving complete judicial discretion). I note that the Sentencing
Commission compares sentences to the bottom of the Guideline range, rather than the midpoint, as I do.
But because the bottom of the Guideline range is approximately 90% of the midpoint for most Guideline
ranges, a sentence that is 16.5% below the bottom of the Guideline range is close to a sentence that is
74% of the midpoint of the Guideline range. See U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (U.S. SENT’G
COMM’N 2021).
249 I conducted a 6 x 1 one-way ANOVA to identify whether there were differences in sentence
between crime type. The test was highly significant. F(5, 296) = 3.25, p = 0.007, η = 0.052.
250 I tested individual differences between crime types using Tukey post hoc tests. Firearms crimes
trended toward proportionally longer sentences than all other crime types except violent crime and other
crime (all p’s < 0.1).
251 I conducted an 11 x 1 one-way ANOVA to identify whether there were differences in sentences
between circuits. The test was significant. F(10, 291) = 1.9, p = 0.045, η = 0.061.
246
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Seventh (61%), and D.C. (61%) Circuits. 252 There were no significant
differences in sentence across the four years in my sample.253
B. Predictive Value of the Sentencing Memoranda
Most of my hypotheses focused on the extent to which the quantity of
mitigation predicts sentencing outcomes. I tested each hypothesis
statistically, as described below.
Hypothesis 1: Increases in the amount of mitigation presented in
sentencing memoranda will be associated with lower sentences relative to
the Guideline range. (Supported.)
Figure 2 shows the total mitigation word count for all of the categories
coded in this study plotted against sentence as a percentage of the midpoint
of the Guideline range. As can be seen from the trend line, increased overall
volume of mitigating arguments was associated with a reduced sentence. The
association was highly significant, with a correlation coefficient of –0.35.254
Thus, the data support Hypothesis 1: presenting more mitigation was
associated with a reduction in sentence relative to the Guideline range.

252 I tested individual differences between circuits using Tukey post hoc tests. The D.C. Circuit’s
sentences trended toward being lower than the First and Eighth Circuits (p’s < 0.1); the Second Circuit’s
sentences trended toward being lower than all circuits other than the Seventh and D.C. Circuits (all
p’s < 0.1); and the Seventh Circuit’s sentences trended toward being lower than all circuits other than the
Second, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits (all p’s < 0.1).
253 The result of the 4 x 1 one-way ANOVA was: F(3, 298) = 0.208, p = 0.891, η = 0.002.
254 p < 0.001. A correlation coefficient of –0.35 is generally considered moderate, though there are
disagreements as to the specific boundary lines between the various descriptive strengths of correlations.
JEREMY MILES & PHILIP BANYARD, UNDERSTANDING AND USING STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY 210
(2007) (showing that, as a general matter, a correlation coefficient of r = 0.1 constitutes a weak
correlation, r = 0.3 constitutes a moderate correlation, and r = 0.5 constitutes a strong correlation).
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FIGURE 2: TOTAL MITIGATION WORD COUNT AND SENTENCE
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Hypothesis 2: Increases in the amount of personal mitigation will be
more strongly associated with lower sentences relative to the Guideline
range than offense mitigation. (Supported.)
Figures 3 and 4 show the total word counts of offense mitigation and
personal mitigation, respectively, plotted against sentence as a percentage of
the midpoint of the Guideline range. As can be seen from the trend lines, as
the amount of personal mitigation in a sentencing memo increases, the
sentence relative to the midpoint of the Guideline range decreases, whereas
that relationship is largely absent for offense mitigation. To test this
statistically, I conducted a multiple linear regression with sentence (as the
percentage of the midpoint of the Guideline range) as the dependent variable
and the three categories of mitigation (offense, personal, and theories-ofpunishment) as independent predictor variables. The overall model was
highly significant. 255 Only personal mitigation significantly predicted the
sentence: personal mitigation had a standardized beta weight of –0.485,256
meaning that when the amount of personal mitigation argument increases by
one standard deviation, the sentence decreases by 0.485 standard

255
256
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deviations.257 Offense mitigation and theories-of-punishment discussion had
beta weights of 0.039 258 and 0.014, 259 respectively—neither of which was
significant. In short, increased amounts of personal mitigation were strongly
associated with reduced sentences, whereas increased amounts of offense
mitigation and theories-of-punishment discussion were not.
FIGURE 3: OFFENSE MITIGATION WORD COUNT AND SENTENCE
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257 See, e.g., PAUL D. ALLISON, MULTIPLE REGRESSION: A PRIMER 30 (1999) (describing
standardized beta weights). The standardized beta weight can generally be treated as an estimate of the
effect size of a given variable. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Meta-Analysis: A Primer for Legal Scholars,
80 TEMP. L. REV. 201, 230 (2007). Putting these abstract numbers to practice, say the midpoint of a
particular defendant’s Guideline range was 100 months. The mean sentence in my data set was 74% of
the midpoint of the Guideline range. So, without knowing anything more, we would expect this
defendant’s sentence to be 74 months. But increasing the amount of personal mitigation presented by 928
words—one standard deviation of that statistic in my data, see infra Table A2—would predict a reduction
in sentence of 0.485 standard deviations of the midpoint of the Guideline range. The standard deviation
of that statistic in my data set was 28.6%. Multiplying the numbers out, with the 928-word increase in
personal mitigation, we would expect the defendant’s sentence to be just over 60 months if observed over
a large sample.
258 p = 0.45.
259 p = 0.8.
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FIGURE 4: PERSONAL MITIGATION WORD COUNT AND SENTENCE
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I also examined whether attorneys spent more words on any of those
three categories of mitigation, independent of sentence. I ran a 3 x 1 repeated
measures ANOVA with the category of mitigation (offense, personal, and
theories-of-punishment) as within-subjects factors. The mean number of
words dedicated to offense mitigation was 761, to personal mitigation was
935, and to theories of punishment was 180. All three of those values differed
significantly—attorneys did devote more words to personal mitigation than
other types, though the difference was not as large as the sentencing results
suggest it should be.260
Hypothesis 3: Certain categories of personal mitigation—character,
collateral consequences, and especially health—will be more strongly
associated with reduced sentences than other personal mitigation factors.
(Supported.)
To examine the relative impact of the sixteen mitigating factors that I
coded for, I conducted a multiple linear regression with sentence (as the
percentage of the midpoint of the Guideline range) as the dependent variable
and the sixteen mitigating factors as predictor variables. The overall model
was highly significant. 261 Table 2 outlines the relative predictive value of
260
261
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each mitigating factor, with offense mitigation factors shaded in white,
personal mitigating factors shaded in light gray, and theories-of-punishment
factors in dark gray.
TABLE 2: REGRESSION DATA OF MITIGATING FACTORS
Standardized Beta
Weight

p-Value

Relative Seriousness

0.075

0.145

Relative Culpability

–0.020

0.691

Independent Variable262

Victim Harm—Minimizing

0.054

0.290

Victim Harm—Acknowledging

0.034

0.497

Remorse—Supported†

–0.102

0.057

Remorse—Unsupported*

0.113

0.025

Historical Trauma†

–0.099

0.060

Character**

–0.194

0.001

General Family and Social
Background

–0.027

0.597

Collateral Consequences**

–0.190

0.001

Health—Supported**

–0.330

0.000

Health—Unsupported

0.057

0.263

Age

0.041

0.418

Deterrence

–0.026

0.636

Incapacitation

0.006

0.902

Rehabilitation

0.088

0.110

Four mitigating factors significantly predicted sentence at the p < 0.05
level: remorse (unsupported), character, collateral consequences, and health
(supported). Relating specifically to Hypothesis 3, there was a pronounced
262 Variables denoted by a * are significant at the p < 0.05 level; with a ** are significant at the
p < 0.01 level. Variables denoted by a † trend toward significance at the p < 0.05 level. I note that these
p-values are not adjusted to account for multiple comparisons. Whenever a researcher conducts multiple
analyses, the possibility of obtaining a statistically significant p-value purely by chance increases. One
common correction for this problem is the Bonferroni correction, which halves the required p-value to
obtain statistical significance for each comparison. Here, with sixteen mitigating factors, the Bonferronicorrected p-value required to obtain significance would be 0.05 / 16 = 0.003. However, Bonferroni
adjustments are very conservative and are not always applied in the multiple regression context, especially
when the results occur in anticipated directions, as mine do. Here, the only results that would be affected
by applying a Bonferroni correction are for the historical trauma factor and the two remorse factors, and
conclusions about those factors are already tempered based on their borderline significance at the 0.05
level. For additional information on the Bonferroni correction and its flaws in application, see Thomas
V. Perneger, What’s Wrong with Bonferroni Adjustments, 316 BRIT. MED. J. 1236 (1998).
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hierarchy in the strength of different categories of personal mitigation.
Supported health mitigation was, by far, the most associated with reduced
sentences relative to the Guideline range: with a beta weight of –0.33, when
the amount of supported health mitigation argument increases by one
standard deviation, the sentence (as a percentage of the midpoint of the
Guideline range) decreases by 0.33 standard deviations (holding all other
variables constant). That is a greater than 50% stronger relationship than
either the character or collateral-consequences factors, which both had nearly
identical beta weights of –0.194 and –0.190, respectively. Historical trauma
tended to predict the sentence, with a beta weight of –0.099, but was not
significant at the 0.05 level. 263 So, while historical trauma nearly
significantly predicts sentence, its relationship with sentence is about half as
strong as the relationship between character mitigation and sentence or
between collateral-consequences mitigation and sentence. And all of those
arguments were much stronger predictors than general family and social
background, unsupported health mitigation, and age, none of which
approached significance in predicting sentence. Figure 5 visualizes those
relationships. In total, the data support Hypothesis 3: supported health
mitigation is the strongest form of mitigation in the study, and collateral
consequences and character are the next strongest. All three were significant
and powerful predictors of a defendant’s sentence in the study.

263
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FIGURE 5: PERSONAL MITIGATION FACTORS AND SENTENCE
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Hypothesis 4: Evidence-based remorse mitigation will be more
strongly associated with reduced sentences than other offense mitigation
factors. (Moderately supported.)
To investigate Hypothesis 4, I used the same multiple linear regression
outlined in Table 2. As expected, none of the offense mitigation factors
significantly predicted sentence other than remorse. Relative culpability had
a very slight negative relationship with sentence—that is, as relative
culpability mitigation increased, sentence decreased—but the relationship
was small and not significant.264 Interestingly, relative seriousness mitigation
had a very slight positive relationship with sentence, meaning that as that
type of mitigating argument increased, the sentence increased. That
relationship, however, was not close to significant. 265 Remorse, however,
was nearly statistically significant when supported and also significantly
predicted an increased sentence when unsupported. 266 I examine this
relationship in more detail under the next hypothesis.
Figure 6 visualizes the relationship between each offense mitigation
factor and sentence.
Hypothesis 5: Mitigating arguments based on objective evidence will
have a greater mitigating effect on the sentence than subjective statements
from the defendant. (Supported.)
As discussed above, two of the factors in the study included a unique
separate code for argument either containing supporting evidence or not:
remorse and health. I anticipated that arguments supported by evidence
would be more associated with reduced sentences than unsupported
arguments, in line with both the experimental evidence and a commonsense
notion of how judges assess mitigation. I investigated this hypothesis by
examining the same multiple linear regression described in the last
hypothesis, outlined in Table 2. As predicted, there were stark differences in
the relationship between those factors and the sentence, depending on
whether they were supported by evidence. Figure 7 shows those differences.

264
265
266
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As seen in Table 2, the standardized beta weight was –0.02, p = 0.691.
See supra Table 2.
As seen in Table 2, p = 0.057.
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FIGURE 6: OFFENSE MITIGATION FACTORS AND SENTENCE
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Note. All x-axes show word counts of the mitigating factor; all y-axes show sentence as a
percentage of the midpoint of the Guideline range. Significant predictors are marked with a
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FIGURE 7: REMORSE AND HEALTH MITIGATION FACTORS AND SENTENCE
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When supported by evidence, remorse mitigation was the only offense
mitigation factor that was even close to producing a significant negative
association with sentence.267 Interestingly, when not supported by evidence,
remorse mitigation had a significant positive relationship with sentence,
meaning that as more unsupported remorse mitigation is presented, the
sentence is expected to increase relative to the Guideline range. 268

267
268
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See supra Figure 6; supra Table 2.
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Unsupported remorse was the only mitigating factor in the study with a
significant positive association with the sentence.
Health mitigation also had the same effect as predicted. When
supported by evidence, health mitigation had, by far, the strongest
association with reduced sentences among all mitigating factors in the
study.269 But when health mitigation was unsupported by evidence, it did not
have a significant relationship with the sentence.270 I explore the implications
of both of these effects in Part VI.
VI. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR LEGAL REFORM
A. Interpretation of Results
This study reports the first empirical examination of the impact of
mitigation on sentencing in real federal felony cases. On the whole, my data
support the hypotheses that (1) mitigation evidence is impactful and related
to reduced views of blameworthiness (and associated reduced sentences),
despite the Guidelines’ minimization of mitigation, and (2) particular types
of mitigating evidence are more persuasive to decision-makers than others.271
While the data reported here are complex, I draw four main conclusions from
them.
First, mitigation is potentially powerful at sentencing, despite the
Guidelines. I found a highly significant correlation between the amount of
mitigation presented as a whole in sentencing memoranda and the sentence
given.272 This implies that sentencing judges are doing what the sentencing
statute instructs them to do: consider all relevant aspects of both the offense
and the offender in fashioning the sentence.273 Moreover, judges do this even
in the context of Guidelines that largely restrict the impact of mitigation.
Their sentences reflect the modern, post-Booker structure: rather than

269

See supra Table 2.
The standardized beta weight was 0.057, p = 0.263. See supra Table 2.
271 As I note below, the regression-based methods I use make it difficult to draw causal conclusions
because we cannot know for sure whether the effects I observe are due to the presentation of mitigation
or due to other factors that might be correlated with the presentation of mitigation. I discuss this in more
detail infra notes 290–309 and accompanying text.
272 It is worth noting, of course, that there is significant variability in the data. This means that, in a
single case, a longer presentation of mitigation will not always be more persuasive. The takeaway for
attorneys should not be to simply write longer sentencing memoranda. Instead, it should be that, among
a large sample, length serves as a reasonable proxy for strength of mitigating arguments, and attorneys
should seek to present as many strong mitigating arguments as possible.
273 Importantly, all of the mitigation that I coded for in the sentencing memoranda was legally
relevant to sentencing—that is, it was based on permissible considerations under the Guidelines or
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
270
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adhering to the strict Guideline approach, judges go outside of the Guidelines
to individualize their sentences based on mitigating evidence.
The result also implies that defendants with greater mitigating
characteristics will tend to be sentenced more leniently. Individuals who
suffered from long-undiagnosed mental illness that steered them away from
a stable life; who contributed heavily to their communities yet could not
avoid a criminal path; or whose critical support for their families would be
derailed by incarceration—the more extensive these characteristics, the more
likely the defendant received a lighter sentence relative to their Guideline
range. This is one of the chief goals of modern sentencing: treating each
defendant separately and applying the principle of parsimony to each case
individually in order to impose the least punitive sentence that can still meet
the ends of punishment.274
Second, mitigation’s power is primarily driven by personal mitigation.
When I separated mitigation into the main categories of offense mitigation,
personal mitigation, and theories-of-punishment discussion, only personal
mitigation significantly predicted the deviation of the sentence from the
midpoint of the Guideline range. 275 This effect was striking, and again
reflects judges’ modern post-Booker views of sentencing. Recall that, just
before Booker, surveyed federal judges said that the greatest challenge to the
Guideline-dominated sentencing scheme was the need “to take into account
the personal characteristics of the defendants.” 276 Likewise, judges in the
2010 survey continued to indicate that numerous individual factors that are
captured under the umbrella of personal mitigation were often relevant in
sentencing.277 My data support the notion that judges’ sentencing decisions
indeed correspond to those views. In that way, my data reflect the
modernization of mitigation that has been progressing for the past fifteen
years, moving from a restrictive, offense-centric Guideline scheme278 to a
more flexible, individualized approach, closer to the nature of sentencing

274 E.g., Dean v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1170, 1175 (2017) (“The list of [§ 3553(a)] factors is
preceded by what is known as the parsimony principle, a broad command that instructs courts to ‘impose
a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary . . . .’” (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a))); see also
Douglas A. Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 49 (“The parsimony
principle . . . calls for the imposition of the least punitive or burdensome punishment that will achieve
valid social purposes.”).
275 See supra notes 255–260 and accompanying text.
276 See U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, supra note 128, at III-24.
277 See supra notes 118–127 and accompanying text.
278 See, e.g., Berman, supra note 67, at 289 (arguing that “offense conduct—and especially
quantifiable harms such as the amount of drugs or money involved in an offense—has an extraordinary
and arguably disproportionate impact on sentencing outcomes”).
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prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.279 It also highlights the fact that,
because the Guidelines minimize personal mitigation, judges are forced to
grant variances below the Guidelines in order to properly account for that
mitigation, rather than granting departures within the Guidelines’
structure.280
Third, evidence-supported health-related mitigation is particularly
important. When I compared all of the individual mitigators in the study
using multiple regression, health mitigation (when supported by evidence)
was, by far, the most powerful predictor of the deviation of the sentence from
the midpoint of the Guideline range. Indeed, the amount of evidencesupported health mitigation in a sentencing memorandum was a more than
50% stronger predictor of the sentence deviation than the next strongest
mitigators—character and collateral consequences. 281 To put that in
perspective, for a defendant with a Guideline-range midpoint of 50 months,
my data predict that each 400-word increase in the amount of supported
health mitigation presented would correspond with a 5-month decrease in
sentence. 282 That is a striking relationship and makes sense of the data
examined in Part II. Judges in the 2010 survey ranked mental condition,
279

Of course, personal mitigation may have more impact than offense mitigation on the sentence as
a proportion of the Guideline range in part because a large component of the Guideline range is based on
aggravating and mitigating factors related to the offense itself, so judges may consider those facts already
“baked in” to the range. While this is likely at least a partial driver to the personal mitigation effect I
found, I doubt it is the complete explanation for several reasons. First, even though some characteristics
of the offense contribute to the Guideline range, the Guidelines by no means account for all aspects of
the offense conduct. Thus, there is still significant daylight for attorneys to present offense mitigation,
even given a particular Guideline range. Second, some aspects of personal mitigation are “baked in” to
the Guideline range just like the offense conduct. Most notably, the amount and severity of a defendant’s
criminal history is often the single greatest determinant to the Guideline range—at certain base offense
levels, the difference between a defendant with the lowest possible criminal history and a defendant with
the highest amounts to a 700% increase in Guideline range. U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A
(U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021). Third, while extensive personal mitigation was associated with greater
reductions in sentence compared to offense mitigation, attorneys spent only slightly more words on
personal mitigation than offense mitigation. In my data, attorneys spent, on average, just over 47% of
their mitigation argument on personal mitigation and just over 43% on offense mitigation. Though this
difference was statistically significant, it is not large. If all offense mitigation and aggravation were
accounted for in the Guidelines, and nothing remained to be argued at sentencing, one would not expect
that attorneys would spend nearly half of their mitigation argument on offense mitigation.
280 United States v. Lacy, 99 F. Supp. 2d 108, 112 (D. Mass. 2000) (“[W]hile the Guidelines’
emphasis on quantity and criminal history drives these high sentences, sadly, other factors, which I
believe bear directly on culpability, hardly count at all: Profound drug addiction, sometimes dating from
extremely young ages, the fact that the offender was subject to serious child abuse, or abandoned by one
parent or the other, little or no education.”).
281 See supra notes 261–263 and accompanying text.
282 For a fuller explanation of the calculation involved to convert a beta weight to a predicted
sentencing value, see supra note 257. I note one limitation to this illustration: at some point, the linear
relationship between the amount of mitigation presented and the sentence imposed is likely to give way
to diminishing returns.
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emotional condition, physical condition, and diminished capacity all among
the most relevant mitigating factors at sentencing, and experimental data in
both the capital and felony context similarly identify mental health trauma
as a potentially powerful mitigator.283 The data also align with an increasing
understanding that mental illness impacts decision-making and has
significant implications for culpability, and that incarcerated people with
mental or physical illness also suffer more during incarceration.284 Moreover,
judges are very familiar with the frequency of mental and physical health
problems in the population of those they sentence; incarcerated individuals
have higher rates of mental and physical illness, both of which often go
untreated in that population. 285 Judges thus have a front-row seat to the
vicious cycle of mental illness, addiction, and crime. The implication for
attorneys is clear: investigating and presenting detailed mitigation about a
defendant’s health conditions, supported by an evidentiary record from
health care providers, is likely among the most important things defense
attorneys can do to aid their clients.286
Fourth, mitigation is robust in a broad array of categories. In addition
to health mitigation, I found that both character and collateral-consequences
mitigation significantly predicted sentencing outcomes, and evidencesupported remorse mitigation and historical-trauma mitigation were very
nearly significant predictors of sentencing outcomes. These results imply
that judges consider mitigation in a socially positive way, conducting a
sophisticated evaluation of culpability that accounts for defendants’ limited
opportunities, positive roles in their communities, important roles in the lives

283

See supra notes 121, 146–150 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., E. Lea Johnston & Conor P. Flynn, Mental Health Courts and Sentencing Disparities,
62 VILL. L. REV. 685, 687–90 (2017) (noting the diminished culpability of mentally ill offenders in the
context of mental health courts’ sentencing severity); E. Lea Johnston, Vulnerability and Just Desert: A
Theory of Sentencing and Mental Illness, 103 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 147, 148–56, 159–83 (2013)
(describing the various ways in which prisoners with mental illness suffer harm during incarceration).
285 See, e.g., E. Lea Johnston, Reconceptualizing Criminal Justice Reform for Offenders with Serious
Mental Illness, 71 FLA. L. REV. 515, 517 (2019) (noting that “roughly 14% of male inmates and as many
as 31% of female inmates suffer from one or more serious mental illnesses,” rates which are “two to three
times higher than those of the general population”); see also Christine Montross, We Must Change How
Our Criminal Justice System Treats People with Mental Illness, TIME (Aug. 5, 2020), https://time.com/
5876045/we-must-change-how-our-criminal-justice-system-treats-people-with-mental-illness/ [https://
perma.cc/47Y2-LLN9] (describing frequent mental health issues in prisons).
286 One drawback of my data in this context is that I did not code separately for different types of
health mitigation as outlined in the Guidelines and by other commentators, such as mental illness, drug
and alcohol addictions, or physical injury. All of those types of health mitigation are represented in one
category in my data. The reason for this was practical—I wanted to ensure that all of the coding
maintained a high reliability, which becomes more difficult as the number of categories increase and
become more specific. But coding specifically for types of health mitigation—and identifying
relationships between those types and sentences—is an area ripe for future work.
284
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of their families, and genuine expressions of regret for committing the
crime.287
My data imply that judges are appropriately considering mitigation in
another way as well: across both expressions of remorse and health
mitigation, judges’ sentences mirrored the extent to which the mitigation was
grounded in evidence, in the direction that we would hope. This indicates
that judges are critically evaluating the evidence presented to support those
types of mitigation claims and are focused on separating genuine mitigation
from unsupported allegation.
*

*

*

In sum, my data imply that judges interpret mitigation in a modern way,
reflecting an evolving social understanding of criminal culpability. The
trends that I observed indicate judges’ increased recognition that prior
circumstances affect the likelihood that individuals turn to crime, thereby
influencing culpability; 288 that modern science and medicine can inform
medical circumstances that affect culpability; and that sentencing should
take these individualized factors into account beyond the limited ways the
Guidelines provide.289
287 See Berman, supra note 67, at 287–88 (describing how juries are well positioned to identify the
specifics of offense conduct, while “judges are better positioned to consider (potentially prejudicial)
offender characteristics”).
288 See, e.g., Jesse Cheng, Compassionate Capital Mitigation, 18 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 351, 357–58
(2020) (describing mitigation in terms of how choices and circumstances throughout a defendant’s life
impact how he came to view committing a crime as a realistic option).
289 One important takeaway from my results is that the Sentencing Guidelines do not account for the
mitigating factors that judges evidently believe are relevant. Some state systems—when identifying
portions of Sentencing Guidelines that are out of line with judicial views—have revised those Guidelines.
But the federal system has not done so. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 6A.05 cmt. e (AM. L. INST.,
Proposed Final Draft 2017) (“In contrast to the federal history, . . . state commissions that have observed
high rates of departure from particular presumptive guidelines have often treated this finding as a basis
to revise the relevant guidelines so that they fall more closely in sync with judicial decisions.”). The
recently finalized the Model Penal Code: Sentencing recommends a more comprehensive method
requiring that guidelines identify “nonexclusive lists of aggravating and mitigating factors that may be
used as grounds for departure from presumptive sentences.” Id. § 6B.02(1); see also STANDARDS FOR
CRIM. JUST.: SENT’G § 18-3.2(a) (AM. BAR ASS’N 1994) (“The legislature or the agency . . . should
identify factors that may mitigate the gravity of an offense or an offender’s culpability in commission of
the offense.”). The 2017 sentencing amendments to the Model Penal Code are relevant to mitigation in
another way as well: for the first time, the Model Penal Code adopted proportionality—the idea that
punishment should be in proportion to an actor’s moral blameworthiness—as the dominant rationale of
punishment. MODEL PENAL CODE: SENT’G § 1.02(2) (requiring sentences “in all cases within a range of
severity proportionate to the gravity of offenses, the harms done to crime victims, and the
blameworthiness of offenders” and permitting utilitarian considerations, such as deterrence and
incapacitation, only when “reasonably feasible” within the boundaries of proportionality). Mitigation is
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There are, however, important limitations to my methods. First, and
most critically: the public docket from which I gathered sentencing
memoranda does not contain defendants’ demographic data, so I was unable
to study how race, class, and gender interact with mitigation. Race and class
touch nearly every aspect of the criminal justice system,290 and mitigation is
very likely no different. Courts and commentators have long noted that some
of the mitigating factors I study here could disproportionately benefit
wealthy, white defendants.291 The paradigmatic example is charitable acts,
which could mitigate a sentence as evidence of good character, but may be
more common among privileged individuals who have the means to carry
out—and document—those acts. Other categories of mitigation that I found
were associated with reduced sentences may also be more available to white
and upper-class defendants. For example, more privileged defendants may
be able to more clearly support mitigating mental and physical health issues,
as they are more likely to have received treatment and to have been able to
document their problems.292 Likewise, wealthier defendants will have greater
resources to investigate and present mitigation. And even when less
privileged defendants are able to present substantial mitigation, there may be

a central component of proportionality analysis, as mitigating evidence shapes the extent to which a
defendant is blameworthy for his conduct. See Paul H. Robinson, Mitigations: The Forgotten Side of the
Proportionality Principle, 57 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 219, 222–24 (2020). For example, when a defendant
presents mitigating evidence indicating that he suffers from a significant mental illness, the evidence may
indicate that he had a reduced ability to control his criminal conduct, thus lowering his moral
blameworthiness for the crime and leading to a reduced sentence under a proportionality rationale. See
id. at 244–49 (describing experimental evidence of mitigation’s impact on proportionality analysis).
While not the focus of this Article, certain aspects of my data support the notion that judges rely on
proportionality analysis in rendering sentences. For example, I observed that health-related mitigation
was the strongest predictor of reduced sentences in the study. That finding makes sense from the
perspective of proportionality, but the presence of health-related mitigation—such as addiction or mental
illness—might undercut an incapacitation-based argument for reduced punishment, as the defendant’s
addiction or mental illness might increase his risk of recidivism.
290 See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 97–139 (2010) (describing disparate impacts of criminal justice policies on
communities of color); James Forman, Jr., Racial Critiques of Mass Incarceration: Beyond the New Jim
Crow, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 21, 22 (2012) (describing racial disparity in prison); Crystal S. Yang, Free at
Last? Judicial Discretion and Racial Disparities in Federal Sentencing, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 75, 102–03
(2015) (finding racial disparities increased following the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker).
291 See, e.g., Hessick, supra note 78, at 1159 n.265 (collecting cases); Hessick & Berman, supra note
71, at 215–17 (noting that traditional mitigating factors can disproportionately benefit wealthy, white
defendants while cautioning against complete exclusion of these factors from consideration); Frank O.
Bowman, III, Dead Law Walking: The Surprising Tenacity of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
51 HOUS. L. REV. 1227, 1256 (2014) (noting that increased judicial discretion may cause “judges to give
undue leniency to criminals of their own class”).
292 See generally M.N. Oliver, Racial Health Inequalities in the USA: The Role of Social Class,
122 PUB. HEALTH 1440, 1441 (2008) (describing how socioeconomic status aggravates racial disparities
in health outcomes).
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race- and class-based bias in the way the judge interprets it.293 But the issue
is nuanced as well: historical trauma mitigation, which trended toward a
significant association with reductions in sentence, may be more prevalent
among less affluent, nonwhite defendants.294 And other important mitigating
factors, such as remorse and collateral consequences, may have less
predictable patterns.295
Though the public docket does not contain data about defendants’ race
or other demographic information, there may be ways to study how race and
class interact with mitigation. Sentencing memoranda occasionally contain
explicit references to the defendant’s race, education level, or socioeconomic
status from which one might be able to glean relevant data. Likewise, internet
searches using the defendant’s name or other publicly available case
information will sometimes yield demographic information about the
defendant. Though using these methods might result in sampling biases (as
the availability of demographic information may correlate with the contents
of the sentencing memorandum itself), they would be important first steps.
I note one measure that I took to control for race in my data. While I
did not have access to defendants’ demographic information, I did code for
the type of crime for which they were convicted.296 There are differences in
the racial makeup across federal crime types. For example, in 2018, about
53% of federal firearm offenders were Black and 26% were white. 297 In
contrast, about 40% of economic crime offenders were white, and 36% were
Black.298 Leveraging those differences, I repeated the regression outlined in
Table 2 with defendants’ crime type coded as a dummy variable to control
for its effect. The results were materially the same as those reported in Table
2, with one exception: when controlling for crime type, historical trauma
mitigation significantly predicted a reduced sentence,299 whereas it had only
a marginally significant relationship with sentence when crime type was not
293 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does
Unconscious Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195, 1221–26 (2009)
(discussing how implicit biases may affect the judgment of trial judges).
294 See Andrea L. Roberts, Stephen E. Gilman, Joshua Breslau, Naomi Breslau & Karestan C.
Koenen, Race/Ethnic Differences in Exposure to Traumatic Events, Development of Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder, and Treatment-Seeking for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in the United States,
41 PSYCH. MED. 71, 74–79 (Jan. 2011).
295 Cf. Hanan, supra note 176, at 304–08 (describing ways in which judgments of remorse are subject
to systematic cognitive bias).
296 See supra note 249 and accompanying text.
297 U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2018 OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 18 (2018),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2019/FY18
_Overview_Federal_Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS46-AJFV].
298 Id. at 20.
299 p < 0.02.
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controlled for. 300 In other words, the results largely do not change when
holding crime type constant. Thus, to the extent that crime type is a proxy
for race, unaccounted-for racial differences associated with crime type were
not the actual cause for the variation in sentencing outcomes that I observed.
And while crime type perhaps only provides a marginal control for effects
of race, it is a useful starting point.
There are several other limitations that warrant mention. First, while it
is tempting to conclude that presenting an increased amount of mitigation
causes judges to impose lower sentences, we cannot draw that conclusion.
All of the analyses I describe here relate to the correlations—statistical
associations—between amounts of mitigation presented and sentence.
Correlation does not equal causation. That means that information other than
the sentencing memoranda I examined may drive—or at least contribute to—
the sentencing effects I observed. What other information might be driving
the effects, if not the sentencing memoranda? There are two potential
sources. First, there may be variables that are not inherently related to
mitigation but might correlate with it, such as race, gender, and
socioeconomic status.301 Though I sought to control for those as discussed
above, follow-up projects will be necessary to fully tease apart the
relationship between race, gender, and socioeconomic status on mitigation.
Second, there may be variables that communicate much of the same
information that sentencing memoranda do but are not accounted for in my
data. One good example of this is the PSR prepared by the probation officer,
which often contains overlapping information with the sentencing
memorandum but is not made publicly available, making it impossible to
control for in my analysis.302
This second category of endogeneity is less of a concern for the
conclusions I draw here, because the source of mitigation is largely
irrelevant, so long as mitigation itself is responsible for the sentencing effects
I observe. Take the PSR as an example. It is largely generated from the same
inputs as the sentencing memorandum: it is drafted following the probation
300

p = 0.06.
The problem of the potential impact of uncontrolled variables like these is often called
“endogeneity.” E.g., Roger D. Blair & Christine Piette Durrance, Licensing Health Care Professionals,
State Action and Antitrust Policy, 100 IOWA L. REV. 1943, 1953 n.41 (2015) (noting that “[a]n
endogenous variable is one that is correlated with the error term,” which is the unexplained variance in
the model).
302 There are other similar potential variables, such as victim impact statements, letters and
statements to the judge from defendants and their families and other supporters, or evidence that is
introduced at the sentencing hearing itself. While I suspect that the sentencing memorandum is the most
important part of the sentencing process—at least as far as impacting the sentence imposed—my data
may be missing important effects of those other sentencing aspects. Some are a part of the public record
in the case and would be good candidates for future study.
301
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department’s interview with the defendant, and the defense attorney is
present for that interview and has a significant role in crafting the PSR.303 In
that way, both the PSR and sentencing memoranda contain similar
information about the variable of interest here: the amount and weight of
mitigating evidence about a defendant that is presented to the judge prior to
sentencing. It largely does not matter to the conclusions drawn here: whether
the mitigation influences the judge via the sentencing memorandum or the
PSR. For example, say a particular PSR and sentencing memorandum
provide a judge with similar information about a defendant’s traumatic
upbringing, and the information from the PSR is what drives the judge’s
decision to impose a lower sentence. The inference about judicial behavior
is still the same, regardless of whether our measurement comes from the
sentencing memorandum or the PSR: mitigation influenced the sentence.304
Moreover, while linear regression will never be able to rule out
unmeasured possible drivers of variation, the data I report here work in
concert with prior experimental data that found causal relationships between
mitigation and culpability judgments.305 Critically, my data largely aligned
with my a priori hypotheses, which were based on those prior controlled
experimental studies. While the correlational data I report here cannot lead
to clear causal conclusions, when combined with the experimental data, they
provide significant support for the theory that presenting mitigating evidence
at sentencing influences judges’ sentencing decisions.
My measure of mitigation—word counts—also has limits: the number
of words spent discussing a particular mitigating factor in a sentencing
memorandum does not necessarily reflect the significance of the mitigation.
Certain types of mitigation may simply be more complex—and require more
words to describe—than others. But while this problem undoubtedly means
that word counts are a noisy measure, there are several reasons to conclude
that they are a good proxy for the weight of a category of mitigating
evidence. First, the word counts in this study strongly predicted sentencing
decisions across a variety of different mitigation factors. If the number of
words devoted to a particular mitigating factor were entirely unrelated to the
303

See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text; FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(e)–(f).
I note one other question that my data leave unanswered: if mitigation is influencing sentencing
as I theorize here, is that influence the result of good lawyering or a defendant whose background contains
many mitigating circumstances to raise? The differences I observed were almost certainly a combination
of both, but future work will be necessary to tease apart the differences. To the extent that mitigation’s
influence is contingent upon defendants having mitigating circumstances to raise, this places a limit on
how much mitigation a defense counsel can effectively include. However, it does not impact the
importance of defense counsel unearthing as many mitigating circumstances through investigation as
possible, or of reforms to facilitate investigation and presentation of mitigation. See infra Section VI.B.
305 See supra Section II.B.
304
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strength of that mitigation, one would expect to see no relationship between
the two. Second, those relationships occurred in anticipated directions, in
line with prior experimental and survey data about mitigation. Third, word
counts, and similar quantity measures, have been reliably used in a variety
of other contexts—including many legal contexts—as a proxy for weight.306
And fourth, judges did not find additional words persuasive when the
arguments were not supported by evidence (in the remorse and health
categories), implying that judges are not simply deferring to (or being
overwhelmed by) the sheer length of arguments.307
There is also some inherent sampling bias in the cases that I collected.
To examine cases where there was potential for mitigation to have an impact
on the sentence, I excluded a number of categories of cases—most notably,
those in which a defendant cooperated with the government leading to a
government request for a reduction in sentence.308 Though those exclusions
were only a small proportion of the total population of cases, if the nature of
the mitigation presented in those cases is different from what is presented in
the cases in my sample, then my data do not present a full picture of how
mitigation operates in all federal cases. Likewise, I could not examine any
cases in which the sentencing memorandum was not filed publicly. While
one common reason for a sentencing memorandum to be sealed is because a
defendant is cooperating with the government, there are other reasons as
well, such as when the memorandum contains extensive discussions of
victims or sensitive personal information about the defendant, such as health

306 See, e.g., Hall & Wright, supra note 218, at 117 (noting that “some studies count the number of
words or paragraphs devoted to discussing particular factors as an indication of the factors’ relative
importance”); David L. Schwartz, Explaining the Demise of the Doctrine of Equivalents, 26 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1157, 1205 (2011) (using word counts as a proxy of significance in judicial opinions); Barton
Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549,
587 (2008) (“[I]n explaining (or defending) their analysis of a legal issue, judges are generally more likely
to dedicate a greater share of their explanations to considerations that they deem to be more
important . . . .”); Jennifer L. Groscup, Steven D. Penrod, Christina A. Studebaker, Matthew T. Huss &
Kevin M. O’Neil, The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony in State and Federal
Criminal Cases, 8 PSYCH., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 339, 343 (2002) (“[T]he length of the discussion in words
devoted to several variables was recorded as a measure of the attention paid to these concepts by the
courts.”); Jeffrey H. Kahn, Renée M. Tobin, Audra E. Massey & Jennifer A. Anderson, Measuring
Emotional Expression with the Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count, 120 AM. J. PSYCH. 263, 266–67
(2007) (measuring participants’ emotional reactions by how frequently they use certain “positive” and
“negative” words); Robert A. Josephs, R. Brian Giesler & David H. Silvera, Judgment by Quantity, 123 J.
EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH.: GEN. 21, 22 (1994) (using page quantity rather than word counts).
307 See supra Table 2.
308 See supra notes 220–226 and accompanying text.
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conditions.309 Indeed, it is possible that the strong effects of health mitigation
I found might underrepresent the true effect, because defendants with the
strongest mitigating health conditions might present those circumstances in
sealed memoranda that I was unable to examine.
B. Implications for Legal Reform
The data I report here provide significant insight into how mitigation
interacts with sentencing outcomes. While the data are interesting from a
theoretical perspective, they also have significant implications for legal
reform and public policy. I describe three below, related to (1) effective
assistance of counsel, (2) the use of neuroscience to inform health mitigation,
and (3) the presentation of mitigation to prosecutors.
1.

Requiring Investigation and Presentation of Mitigation to
Constitute Effective Assistance of Counsel
Inherent within the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is a right to
effective counsel—lawyering that meets a certain basic level of competence,
the lack of which would “undermine[] the proper functioning of the
adversarial process” such that the proceeding “cannot be relied on as having
produced a just result.”310
That right extends to sentencing. 311 In capital cases—in which
mitigation is a firmly entrenched part of the sentencing phase—the right has
translated to a requirement that defense attorneys thoroughly investigate and
present mitigation in arguing for a nondeath sentence.312 But in noncapital
cases, what constitutes effective assistance at sentencing is far less clear.313
Before Booker, the Supreme Court held that failing to raise a legitimate
challenge to the Guideline range was prejudicial and ineffective. 314 The
Court has not squarely readdressed that issue since Booker rendered the

309 See generally Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597–99 (1978) (recognizing that
the common law right of public access to court documents is not absolute considering case-specific
competing factors); United States v. Harris, 890 F.3d 480, 492 (4th Cir. 2018) (identifying protection of
physical and psychological well-being as a legitimate interest in sealing records).
310 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
311 E.g., id. (“The same principle applies to a capital sentencing proceeding . . . .”); see also Glover
v. United States, 531 U.S. 198, 200 (2001) (applying the Strickland test in a noncapital felony case).
312 See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533–34 (2003) (defining the Strickland standard for
investigating mitigation). For a full discussion of the requirements of investigating and presenting
mitigation in capital cases, see Gohara, supra note 106, at 54–57.
313 Strickland itself implied that the standard at a typical felony sentencing may be less stringent than
in the capital context. 466 U.S. at 686 (“We need not consider the role of counsel in an ordinary
sentencing, which may involve informal proceedings and standardless discretion in the sentencer, and
hence may require a different approach to the definition of constitutionally effective assistance.”).
314 Glover, 531 U.S. at 199–200.
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Guidelines advisory,315 and while some lower courts have found ineffective
assistance based on advisory Guideline errors, those cases are infrequent.316
Given the difficulty of even showing that an attorney’s failure to raise a
meritorious Guideline challenge amounts to ineffective assistance of
counsel, one can imagine how difficult it is to assert that a failure to present
mitigating evidence would amount to ineffective assistance—mitigation
usually does not affect the Guideline range. Unsurprisingly, with this
framework in place, several courts have held that a failure to present
mitigating evidence in noncapital felony sentencing is not necessarily
ineffective. 317 And those cases often contain language implying the near
impossibility that a defendant could show his counsel was ineffective on that
ground. For example, in one bank robbery case in which the defendant’s
history of mental illness went unpresented, the Fifth Circuit required the
defendant to make a “‘specific, affirmative showing of what the [mitigating]
evidence would have been’ to lead to a lower sentence.”318
When Strickland v. Washington was decided in 1984 and modern
ineffective assistance jurisprudence was developed, mitigation had a less
critical role because the Guidelines heavily restricted the extent to which
judges could consider many potentially mitigating circumstances. After
Booker, mitigation has taken on a greater significance. But as Carissa
Hessick has noted, the ineffective assistance jurisprudence has been unable
to catch up with that heightened importance because sentencing judges’
increased discretion has resulted in a lack of substantive sentencing law,
which makes it more difficult to demonstrate ineffective assistance.319 And

315 The Supreme Court has, however, explained that “[w]hen a defendant is sentenced under an
incorrect Guidelines range[,] . . . the error itself can, and most often will, be sufficient to show” prejudice.
Molina-Martinez v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1338, 1345 (2016). But that holding does not mean that a
failure to make proper guideline arguments will always amount to deficient performance.
316 See, e.g., United States v. Curtis, 360 F. App’x 413, 414–15 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding that the
failure to object to improperly calculated Guideline range amounted to ineffective assistance); United
States v. Daily, No. 03-381-1, 2011 WL 3920260, at *2 (D. Minn. Sept. 7, 2011) (holding that counsel’s
failure to raise the Guideline range calculation error deprived the defendant of his Sixth Amendment
right).
317 See, e.g., United States v. Israel, No. 17-10948, 2020 WL 7658421, at *26 (5th Cir. Dec. 23,
2020) (“[F]ailing to put on mitigating evidence at the punishment phase of the trial . . . is not per se
ineffective assistance.” (alterations in original) (quoting Rector v. Johnson, 120 F.3d 551, 564 (5th Cir.
1997))); Rodriguez v. United States, No. 08-CV-21-T-27TBM, 2010 WL 1790430, at *5 (M.D. Fla. May
4, 2010) (holding that counsel’s alleged omission of mitigating circumstances did not render assistance
ineffective); Luellen v. United States, No. 08cr102, 2011 WL 4565348, at *5 (E.D. Va. Sept. 28, 2011)
(holding that a decision concerning whether to present a mitigating witness was strategic and therefore
not ineffective); United States v. Perrigo-Haddon, 221 F. App’x 619, 621 (9th Cir. 2007) (suggesting
certain mitigating evidence “was not particularly important or material”).
318 Israel, 2020 WL 7658421, at *11 (alterations in original) (quoting Rector, 120 F.3d at 564).
319 Hessick, supra note 105, at 1105–06.
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even if an attorney entirely fails to investigate for mitigating circumstances,
it is difficult for a defendant to show prejudice when he cannot demonstrate
any certainty that the mitigation would have affected his Guideline range or
sentence—a problem exacerbated by the Guidelines’ restrictive view of
mitigation.
That near impossibility appears extraordinarily unfair given that my
data (as well as the experimental and survey data about mitigation) suggest
that mitigation in felony cases is powerful, and strongly associated with
lower sentences. In effect, the data imply that defendants are likely
prejudiced by a failure to present mitigation, even if they cannot demonstrate
it with certainty in their individual case. And the data also show that there is
an enormous range in the amount of mitigation presented across cases. While
some of that is surely tied to factors outside defense attorneys’ control—
some defendants simply have more mitigating circumstances to raise than
others—there is unquestionably a wide range in the quality of defense
attorneys’ presentations. My data suggest those differences in the quality of
representation may be outcome determinative; that is, they may affect the
sentence the defendant receives.320 That is exactly the type of injustice that
ineffective assistance jurisprudence seeks to avoid.
How can we remedy this? There are a number of possible ways, but I
suggest two first steps. First, recognizing that mitigation is central to postBooker advisory sentencing, lower courts should identify a baseline duty
under the Strickland framework to make reasonable investigations into
mitigating circumstances for all felony defendants. This already exists in the
capital context—ineffective assistance in many capital cases results from

320

Former federal defender Carrie Leonetti put it well in a recent piece:

One of the last sentencing hearings that I had was before a pretty conservative, former-prosecutor
judge, the same one who had tried to do me a solid with the phone call to my boss a few months
earlier. It was a half-day affair, during which I presented substantial mitigating evidence on my
client’s behalf. Mostly, the evidence consisted of the nature of her mental illness and horrible
childhood abuse that probably contributed to it—the same mitigating evidence that most criminal
defendants have, if investigated and presented. At the end of the hearing, the judge gave my client
a sentence substantially below her guidelines. After the Court recessed, I had this conversation.
Judge: “Boy, Ms. Leonetti, your clients seem to have the most incredible mitigating
circumstances. It’s amazing how you always draw these really sympathetic clients.”
Me: “Your Honor, with all due respect, seriously? I work in an office with ten lawyers. Our
cases are assigned pretty much at random. I’m not a statistician, but don’t you think that me
‘drawing’ all of the sympathetic ones is, um, mathematically unlikely?”
I will never forget the look on his face as it slowly dawned on him that he spent most of his
days hammering equally sympathetic defendants simply because their lawyers were not doing
their jobs.
Carrie Leonetti, Painting the Roses Red: Confessions of a Recovering Public Defender, 12 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 371, 383 (2015).
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counsel’s failure to investigate mitigating circumstances. 321 Adopting this
requirement for noncapital cases would not require any new theoretical
underpinning (though it would require greater resources). The idea behind
requiring an investigation into mitigating circumstances in death penalty
cases—to permit the sentencing party to evaluate the full scope of the nature
of the crime and the characteristics of the defendant in deciding whether to
impose a serious penalty—applies equally in felony cases.322 And there is
daylight for district courts to reach this conclusion; the current case law does
not make clear that the duty to investigate mitigating evidence applies only
in capital cases. 323 But a review of the cases indicates that virtually no
noncapital cases have applied a mitigation-investigation requirement.324
A second step would be to clearly identify what that investigation
should entail, including providing guideposts for specific types of mitigation
that defense counsel should investigate and present. The most
straightforward way to do this would be through the American Bar
Association’s (ABA’s) Standards for Criminal Justice, which the Supreme
Court has referenced as a “guide[] to determining what is reasonable”
conduct under the Strickland standard. 325 While the ABA guidance for
321 See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (holding that, in the capital context,
“counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes
particular investigations unnecessary”); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (ruling that
counsel’s failure to uncover and present voluminous mitigating evidence at sentencing could not be
justified as a tactical decision because counsel had not “fulfill[ed] their obligation to conduct a thorough
investigation of the defendant’s background”).
322 See, e.g., Gohara, supra note 106, at 44 (“[T]here is simply no principled reason that the same
circumstances that courts have recognized narrow opportunity and distort the lives of people charged with
capital crimes should not be presented to courts sentencing people for lesser offenses.”); William W.
Berry III, Individualized Sentencing, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 13, 22–24 (2019) (arguing for broad
application of Eighth Amendment principles that currently require individualized sentencing only in
capital cases).
323 Indeed, current American Bar Association standards require defense attorneys to investigate, at
least summarily. STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.: DEF. FUNCTION § 4-8.3(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017)
(“Defense counsel should gather and submit to the presentence officers, prosecution, and court as much
mitigating information relevant to sentencing as reasonably possible.”). But this pales in comparison to
the guidance provided in capital cases, which is far more detailed. See Hessick, supra note 105, at 1110–
11; Am. Bar Ass’n, Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death
Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 959–60 (2003) (outlining the requirement for participation of
mitigation specialist in capital cases). For a discussion of how a failure to investigate mitigation may
trigger a rebuttable presumption of inadequate performance, see Eve Brensike Primus, Disaggregating
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Doctrine: Four Forms of Constitutional Ineffectiveness, 72 STAN. L.
REV. 1581, 1635–36 (2020).
324 For example, I conducted a Westlaw search containing the terms, “mitigate! & reasonabl! /s
invest!,” which yielded only capital cases applying the requirement. See supra note 317 (collecting cases).
325 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; see also Williams, 529 U.S. at 396 (citing the ABA’s Standards when
finding that counsel did not thoroughly investigate mitigation); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 387
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noncapital criminal cases recommends that defense counsel “gather and
submit to the presentence officers, prosecution, and court as much mitigating
information relevant to sentencing as reasonably possible,” 326 it does not
provide any further detail as to what type of mitigation is relevant. In
contrast, the guidance in capital cases contains commentary outlining in
detail the type of mitigation that should be investigated, including “medical
history,” “family and social history,” “other traumatic events,” “educational
history,” “military service,” “employment and training history,” and “prior
juvenile and adult correctional experience.” 327 Criminal justice would be
better served by explicitly articulating similar requirements in all felony
cases, in which those same categories of mitigation are likely to impact the
sentence, as my data imply.
Of course, part of the reason for the current low requirement is surely
caseload volume and a lack of funding. 328 The significance and rarity of
capital cases means that more resources are warranted and available to be
devoted to them, allowing for far more detailed investigation into mitigation.
But conducting a basic investigation into the history and background of a
defendant need not always be expensive—it can start with a simple and
detailed discussion with the defendant and follow-up investigation from
there. And in the wake of the murder of George Floyd and subsequent mass
attention on criminal justice issues in America, indigent defense has seen a
rise in public support, which may lead to greater resources. Public defender
offices should consider focusing increased funding on mitigation, especially
on hiring mitigation specialists to work in routine felony cases.329
2.

Increasing the Use of Health Mitigation Through Neuroscience
and Mental Health Examination
One of the most striking effects this study revealed is that health is the
strongest potential mitigator when sufficiently supported by evidence in the
record—associated with a 50% greater reduction in sentence than any other

(2005) (highlighting the clear language of the ABA's Standards, often relied upon by the Court for what
is reasonable); Hessick, supra note 105, at 1075 (referencing Strickland’s reliance on the ABA’s
Standards).
326 STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.: DEF. FUNCTION § 4-8.3(d).
327 Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 323, at 1022–23; see also Gohara, supra note 106, at 59 (“While the
current guidelines for noncapital defense sentencing advocacy are broad enough to warrant some degree
of independent sentencing investigation beyond the data provided by probation departments or
prosecutors, they remain a far cry from the capital guidelines’ specific prescriptions for comprehensive
social history investigation.”).
328 See Gohara, supra note 106, at 70–73.
329 See id. at 48–49. For a helpful examination into the role of mitigation specialists, albeit in the
death penalty context, see generally Hughes, supra note 102, and see Am. Bar Ass’n, supra note 323, at
959–60 (describing the role of a mitigation specialist).
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mitigator.330 And while my data did not code separately for different types of
health-related mitigation, a substantial amount of what I observed related to
mental health—disorders and addiction—rather than pure physical ailments.
The judicial survey and experimental data are also consistent with those
results and anecdotal observations.331
Thus, explaining to the judge that a defendant has significant,
documented health problems—especially mental health problems—that
could impact criminal culpability appears to be a critical part of felony
sentencing. This conclusion will come as no surprise to practitioners in
capital cases. There, the investigation into and presentation of a defendant’s
history of mental illness is frequently a critical part of the penalty phase—
indeed, the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained the necessity of such
mitigation in its death penalty jurisprudence. 332 One potentially powerful
way to provide evidence of mental illness in capital cases is through
neuroscience evidence, which can come as either imaging evidence (such as
an MRI or CAT scan) or behavioral testing or examination that provides data
about the function of an individual’s brain that is relevant to his mental
health, and ultimately his culpability.333 In a recent study, Deborah Denno
330

See supra notes 261–263 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121–122 and accompanying text.
332 See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (finding counsel’s investigation to be
unreasonable in large part due to the failure to uncover any evidence of Porter’s mental health); Wiggins
v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537 (2003) (“Wiggins’ sentencing jury heard only one significant mitigating
factor—that Wiggins had no prior convictions. Had the jury been able to place petitioner’s excruciating
life history on the mitigating side of the scale, there is a reasonable probability that at least one juror
would have struck a different balance.”).
333 See, e.g., Nita A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law: An
Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 485 (2015) (analyzing judicial opinions regarding the use of
neurological and behavioral genetic evidence in favor of criminal defendants); Judith G. Edersheim,
Rebecca Weintraub Brendel & Bruce H. Price, Neuroimaging, Diminished Capacity and Mitigation, in
NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM 163, 175–84 (Joseph
R. Simpson ed., 2012) (describing various mitigation arguments that can be developed through imaging,
including frontal lobe disorders, psychosis, anxiety disorders, substance use disorders, and developmental
disorders); Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword: An Empirical Study of
Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493, 500, 548–49 (2015) (finding that
neuroscience evidence tends to be used in favor of criminal defendants, rather than wielded as a sword
against them); Shelly Batts, Brain Lesions and Their Implications in Criminal Responsibility, 27 BEHAV.
SCIS. & L. 261, 261–65 (2009) (discussing the impact of neuroimaging in determining legally relevant
mental disorders); Eyal Aharoni, Chadd Funk, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Michael Gazzaniga, Can
Neurological Evidence Help Courts Assess Criminal Responsibility? Lessons from Law and
Neuroscience, 1124 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCIS. 145 (2008) (identifying how neurological evidence and
technology can probe for criminal responsibility); Michael S. Pardo & Dennis Patterson, Philosophical
Foundations of Law and Neuroscience, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1211, 1231–35 (describing how neurology
relates to criminal law doctrines such as actus reus and mens rea). For a more general examination into
the emerging field of law & neuroscience, including the potential for neuroimaging techniques to provide
mitigation, see OWEN D. JONES, JEFFREY D. SCHALL & FRANCIS X. SHEN, LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 1–
67 (2014).
331
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identified over 500 cases during a twenty-year period—most of them capital
cases—in which neuroscience evidence was used either to show mitigating
mental health circumstances, or that a defense attorney was ineffective in
failing to present such mitigation.334 Some of the mitigating evidence that
Denno examined allowed experts to draw very powerful conclusions about
defendants’ reduced culpability based on their mental health, such as
concluding that a defendant’s brain structure caused “an impaired capacity
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law.”335 And while some had
previously speculated that neuroscience could serve as a double-edged
sword—sometimes providing aggravating evidence of the defendant’s future
dangerousness—Denno’s data largely contradicted that theory, finding that
neuroscience evidence was usually mitigating and fit in with “a criminal
justice system that is willing to accept modern methods of assessing
defendants’ mental capabilities, and expects its attorneys to do the same.”336
Mitigating neuroscience evidence is common in capital cases but not in
routine felony cases.337 But capital defendants are surely not alone in having
mitigating mental illness that could be supported by neuroscience evidence
at sentencing. The very same reasons that neuroscience data may be
mitigating in capital cases—for example, by showing a defendant was less
culpable for his crime because mental illness or addiction reduced his ability
to control his behavior—apply in other criminal cases as well.338 And while
capital defendants may have greater rates of mental illness or other
potentially mitigating health circumstances than defendants in noncapital
criminal cases, that difference could not come close to accounting for the
difference in rate of presenting mitigating neuroscience evidence. Instead,
the very likely explanation is that many defendants in all types of felony

334

Denno, supra note 333, at 501–11.
Id. at 515–17 (discussing Simmons v. State, 105 So. 3d 475, 505 (Fla. 2012)).
336 Id. at 544.
337
Over two-thirds of the cases Denno found were capital cases. Id. at 501–02. And those rare
noncapital cases in which neuroscience evidence is presented typically involve very serious charges with
extensive prison sentences. See, e.g., King v. Kemna, 226 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that
neuroscience mitigation evidence was presented in first-degree assault case involving gunshot); Bernice
B. Donald & Erica Bakies, A Glimpse Inside the Brain’s Black Box: Understanding the Role of
Neuroscience in Criminal Sentencing, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 481, 494 (2016) (noting neuroscience’s use
primarily in “very serious cases”).
338 Donald & Bakies, supra note 337, at 498 (“Neuroscience can provide a qualified assessment of
how culpable society may want to hold a particular person, given their background and its effect on their
abilities to process situations in accordance with societal norms.”); see also Deborah W. Denno, Courts’
Increasing Consideration of Behavioral Genetics Evidence in Criminal Cases: Results of a Longitudinal
Study, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 976–79 (describing how genetic evidence can contribute to
mitigation).
335
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cases have mitigating mental health problems that are simply not being
investigated.
Based on the data that I report here, that lack of evidence should cause
significant concern because it means that judges are not receiving
information that is potentially more relevant to their sentencing decision than
any other mitigating information. The problem likely stems, at least in part,
from attorneys who are simply unaware of the benefit of presenting
neuroscience evidence—or any health evidence at all—as mitigation. But in
addition to that, cost is likely a particularly prohibitive factor—hiring experts
to evaluate defendants for mental health mitigation is expensive. 339 While
cost may seem like an insurmountable hurdle, it is worth noting that
neuroscience evidence of the type that Denno documented is often used in
felony cases in one nonsentencing context: competency.340 When either the
prosecution or the defense raises doubt that the defendant is competent to
stand trial, the court is required to refer the defendant for an evaluation if
there is “reasonable cause” for the doubt.341 What qualifies as “reasonable
cause” is a matter of discretion for the district judge, but operates as a very
low bar—the judge can make the decision based on his mere observations of
the defendant’s behavior or reports of such behavior from counsel.342 The
end result is that the defendant generally receives an examination any time
either party indicates a good faith doubt as to the defendant’s competency.
One way to allow the court to benefit from more complete healthrelated mitigation at sentencing would be to create a procedural mechanism
that requires a similar evaluation if there is “reasonable cause” to believe that
the defendant suffers from a health problem that is relevant to the sentencing
determination. Such a measure would require the action of a legislative body
or a rulemaking committee and would likely be costly. But there is at least
some indication that there would be particular support for an increased focus
on mental health—it is one of the few personal mitigation categories the
Guidelines explicitly recognize “may be relevant in determining whether a
departure is warranted,” 343 and an array of recent research indicates that

339 See, e.g., James N. Bow, Michael C. Gottlieb & Dianna Gould-Saltman, Attorneys’ Beliefs and
Opinions About Child Custody Evaluations, 49 FAM. CT. REV. 301, 307 (2011) (noting practitioners
citing cost concerns with psychological evaluations in the child custody context).
340 Denno, supra note 333, at 510 n.112 (“Examples of these mental health defenses include . . .
incompetency to stand trial.”).
341 18 U.S.C. § 4241(a).
342 United States v. Jackson, 815 F. App’x 398, 402 (11th Cir. 2020).
343 U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.3 (U.S. SENT’G COMM’N 2021).
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mental health issues are pervasive in the criminal justice system and have
complex interactions with crime.344
Absent a change in procedural rules, a second way to achieve similar
ends would be to amend the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice to explicitly
require a mental health investigation of the type described above if a defense
attorney has reasonable cause to believe her client suffers from a health
problem that is relevant to the sentencing determination. This would be a less
complete measure than a statutory or procedural rule change: if a defense
attorney failed to follow the ABA guidance, a defendant’s only recourse
would be to claim ineffective assistance of counsel, which is a long and
difficult path. In contrast, a statutory or rule-based change would be directly
supervised by the trial court and would allow a defendant to challenge any
error on direct appeal. But a change to the ABA rules would be a significant
first step.
3. Presenting Mitigation to Prosecutors
So far, we have discussed mitigation in the context of sentencing and
judicial decision-making. But there is another decision-maker whose impact
on the sentence can, in some circumstances, be just as great: the prosecutor.
Prosecutors wield significant power throughout the course of a case: they
decide whether to charge an individual, what charges to bring, whether and
what type of plea bargain to offer, and what sentence to recommend to the
judge if the case results in a conviction.345 Prosecutors carry out these tasks
with almost complete discretion and little requirement to report the reasons
for their decisions.346 While there is a compelling case that sentencing is a
critical part of the criminal justice process,347 charging and plea bargaining
are undoubtedly also important—through plea bargains, prosecutors can
affect the maximum and minimum penalties to which the defendant is
subject by dismissing charges, restrict the range of sentences available to the
judge for the charges to which the defendant pleads guilty, or even entirely

344

See Johnston, supra note 285, at 517–23 (summarizing associations between mental illness and
crime, but noting that other factors also associated with mental illness, such as substance abuse,
employment instability, and family problems, mediate those effects).
345 See, e.g., JOHN F. PFAFF, LOCKED IN: THE TRUE CAUSES OF MASS INCARCERATION—AND HOW
TO ACHIEVE REAL REFORM 127–34 (2017) (describing the power of prosecutors, including
“unreviewable ability to decide whether to file charges”); Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution,
108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2020) (describing consensus that prosecutors are “the most powerful
officials in the criminal justice system” (quoting ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF
THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 5 (2007))); Shima Baradaran Baughman & Megan S. Wright, Prosecutors
and Mass Incarceration, 94 S. CAL. L. REV. 1123, 1127–29 (2021) (outlining the power associated with
prosecutorial discretion).
346 PFAFF, supra note 345, at 157–59; Baughman & Wright, supra note 345, at 1127–29.
347 See supra Section I.A.
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bypass the sentencing process when the parties agree to a particular
sentence.348 And even after conviction, prosecutors have a role in crafting the
sentence by making a sentencing recommendation to the judge.349 While my
data suggest that prosecutors’ ability to shape the sentence is heavily
constrained by judges’ consideration of mitigating evidence, there is no
doubt that prosecutors impact sentencing.
Given that role, one might think that there would be a systematic
method for defense counsel to present mitigation to the prosecution during
the litigation, either to secure a more favorable plea agreement or to persuade
the prosecutor to make a more lenient sentencing recommendation. There is
not. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not require the parties to
meet and confer regarding mitigating circumstances; indeed, they explicitly
prohibit the court from “participat[ing]” in plea negotiations.350 Of course,
defense counsel is always free to contact the prosecution and present
mitigation in the plea-bargaining process. But it is unclear how often this
happens in practice.351 Given the wide variability in the amount of mitigation
presented in sentencing memoranda,352 it is likely that there is similarly wide
variability among defense counsel in the extent to which they present
mitigation to prosecutors.
To the extent that prosecutors do receive mitigation before engaging in
plea negotiations or making a sentencing recommendation, we similarly do
not know how that mitigation affects their decision-making. Prosecutors are
extremely difficult to study because they do not release information about
their decisions—we know very little about even core prosecutorial functions,
such as how charging decisions are made, let alone how mitigating
information affects prosecutors’ plea offers or sentencing
recommendations.353 The limited experimental data we do have suggests that
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1) (permitting plea agreements to specify that the prosecutor will “not
bring, or will move to dismiss, other charges,” or will “recommend . . . that a particular sentence or
sentencing range is appropriate,” or that the parties “agree that a specific sentence or sentencing range is
the appropriate disposition of the case,” which “binds the court once the court accepts the plea
agreement”).
349 See, e.g., United States’ Sentencing Memorandum and Motion for Downward Departure from
Guideline Sentencing Range, United States v. Naaman, No. 08-246, 2011 WL 13079247, at *3, *6
(D.D.C. Jan. 22, 2011) (noting the Guidelines’ recommended sentencing range and advocating for a
reduced sentence because of defendant’s cooperation with the government).
350 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(1).
351
See Baughman & Wright, supra note 345, at 1136 (noting that plea bargaining is difficult to
monitor or control through the democratic process, as it “often takes place in private meetings”).
352 See supra Figure 2.
353 See, e.g., Baughman & Wright, supra note 345, at 1130–31 (noting the lack of data on
prosecutorial decision-making). Some newly elected state prosecutors are implementing policies to make
348
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there is significant variability in how prosecutors make charging decisions,354
which implies there is likely to be similar variability in how they make plea
offers or arrive at sentencing recommendations.
There are reasons, however, to expect that mitigation will impact
prosecutors’ plea and sentencing decisions. Traditionally, the Department of
Justice maintained a policy in which prosecutors were required to “charge
and pursue the most serious, readily provable offense or offenses that [were]
supported by the facts of the case.”355 During the Obama Administration,
however, federal policy allowed significantly more leeway to consider
individual characteristics of defendants. Recognizing that “equal justice
depends on individualized justice,” prosecutors were instructed to make an
“individualized assessment” of a variety of factors, including the offense
conduct, defendant’s criminal history, circumstances leading to the
commission of the offense, and the needs of the community in deciding how
to charge cases, what plea terms to offer, and what sentence to request.356
Other guidance specifically permitted prosecutors to consider “case-specific
aggravating or mitigating factors” in determining whether to seek particular
sentencing enhancements.357 Though those policies were rescinded under the
Trump Administration, they have largely been reinstated in the Biden
Administration. 358 And the transition toward an increased willingness to
consider individual defendants’ circumstances is even more pronounced in
their decisions more transparent, which will allow scholars to study their decisions. For example, in
Washtenaw County in Michigan, Eli Savit has announced a “prosecutor transparency project” with the
ACLU and faculty at the University of Michigan to collect and analyze data about charging decisions,
plea bargaining, and disparities in outcomes across a variety of factors. WASHTENAW CNTY. OFF. OF THE
PROSECUTING ATT’Y, PROSECUTOR TRANSPARENCY PROJECT: PRELIMINARY SCOPE OF WORK AND
WORKFLOW 1–2 (2021), https://www.washtenaw.org/DocumentCenter/View/19100/ProsecutorTransparency-Project---Preliminary-Scope-of-Work [https://perma.cc/FJ9G-G976].
354 Baughman & Wright, supra note 345, at 1158–64.
355 Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors, Department Policy
Concerning Charging Criminal Offenses, Disposition of Charges, and Sentencing (Sept. 22, 2003),
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/September/03_ag_516.htm [https://perma.cc/HNN8-5XJ9].
356 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors, Department Policy on
Charging and Sentencing (May 19, 2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/legacy/2014/
07/23/holder-memo-charging-sentencing.pdf [https://perma.cc/GH7X-HASW].
357 Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att’y Gen., to the U.S. Att’ys & Assistant Att’y Gen. for the
Crim. Div., Department Policy on Charging Mandatory Minimum Sentences and Recidivist
Enhancements in Certain Drug Cases (Aug. 12, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/oip/
legacy/2014/07/23/ag-memo-department-policypon-charging-mandatory-minimum-sentences-recidivist
-enhancements-in-certain-drugcases.pdf [https://perma.cc/638U-FQJH].
358 Memorandum from Monty Wilkinson, Acting Att’y Gen., to All Federal Prosecutors, Interim
Guidance on Prosecutorial Discretion, Charging, and Sentencing (Jan. 29, 2021), https://www.justice.
gov/ag/page/file/1362411/download [https://perma.cc/SG5B-URRH]. A recent empirical project
demonstrated that these policies had significant and intricate effects on federal sentences. See Mona
Lynch, Matt Barno & Marisa Omori, Prosecutors, Court Communities, and Policy Change: The Impact
of Internal DOJ Reforms on Federal Prosecutorial Practices, 59 CRIMINOLOGY 480, 506, 510–11 (2021).
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some state systems. Recently, as a number of progressive local prosecutors
have taken office in major cities around the country,359 they have instituted
similar policies to allow prosecutors to consider individual mitigating
circumstances in charging and plea negotiations.360
Given these changes toward receptiveness to mitigation, and my data
indicating that mitigating evidence can have a powerful effect on a
defendant’s perceived culpability, there is little reason not to present
mitigation to prosecutors early in a case. Moreover, if an attorney is likely to
investigate and present mitigation at the sentencing phase of the case—
especially if the law moves toward requiring it as I argue that it should—
presenting it earlier to the prosecutor may not even require additional
resources, but instead just require those resources to be used earlier in the
case. Yet it appears likely that prosecutors do not receive mitigation in many
cases.
What are some possible remedies? A comprehensive one would be to
encourage the prosecutor and defense attorney to meet and confer to discuss
mitigating circumstances, either through broadly applicable procedural rules
or individual judges’ practice guidelines. Some jurisdictions have analogous
requirements in the civil context. For example, California permits judges to
set mandatory settlement conferences in civil cases, at which the parties are
required to submit good faith settlement offers and provide a statement
identifying “facts and law pertinent to the issues of liability and damages
involved in the case.”361 Likewise, some federal courts require parties in civil
cases to meet and confer regarding settlement prior to any pretrial
conference. 362 Courts could adopt similar rules in the criminal context,
359

Bellin, supra note 345, at 1205–07; Benjamin Levin, Imagining the Progressive Prosecutor,
105 MINN. L. REV. 1415, 1422 (2021) (describing a “[r]ecent . . . surge in DA candidates branding
themselves (or embracing the mantle of) ‘progressive prosecutors’”).
360 For example, in Washtenaw County in Michigan, Eli Savit has implemented a juvenile charging
policy that considers several mitigating factors to consider in deciding whether to file charges, including
age and whether the defendant has a “diagnosed disability or behavioral disorder.” WASHTENAW CNTY.
OFF. OF THE PROSECUTING ATT’Y, POLICY DIRECTIVE 2021-11: POLICY REGARDING JUVENILE
CHARGING 1–7 (2021), https://www.washtenaw.org/DocumentCenter/View/19298/Juvenile-ChargingPolicy [https://perma.cc/6RPK-3D4H]. Likewise, Rachel Rollins—once the district attorney in Suffolk
County, Massachusetts and now the U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts, and one of the
earliest and most prominent outwardly progressive prosecutors—released an in-depth policy memo
describing a number of mitigating circumstances that prosecutors in her office should consider throughout
the case, particularly noting that “[s]ubstance use disorder, poverty, mental illness, and the behaviors that
often result from them, should never serve as a justification for incarceration.” RACHAEL ROLLINS, THE
RACHAEL ROLLINS POLICY MEMO 37 (2019), http://files.suffolkdistrictattorney.com/The-RachaelRollins-Policy-Memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4HQ-R28L].
361 CAL. R. CT. 3.1380(c)(4).
362 See, e.g., E.D. MICH. R. 16.2(a), (b)(12), https://www.mied.uscourts.gov/PDFFIles/localRules
Package.pdf [https://perma.cc/75RS-NNDK].

1474

116:1395 (2022)

Modern Sentencing Mitigation

requiring the parties to meet and confer prior to the pretrial conference.
While the current procedural rules may limit the extent to which the court
could require the parties to discuss mitigating circumstances specifically, the
rules could at least facilitate those conversations through a required in-person
meeting, with mitigation as one possible topic of discussion at that
meeting.363
Of course, changes to procedural rules can be complex, difficult, and
slow. But other types of reform could happen more rapidly. If progressive
prosecutors believe that early presentation of mitigating evidence would
impact their plea offers or sentencing recommendations, they could simply
encourage it, either internally by communicating with public defenders’
offices, or externally by releasing a policy statement welcoming the early
presentation of comprehensive mitigation.
Last, similar to the problems related to ineffective assistance claims and
presentation of neuroscience mitigation, ABA guidance could help. The
current guidance requires only that defense attorneys “gather and submit to
the . . . prosecution . . . as much mitigating information relevant to
sentencing as reasonably possible.” 364 That guidance could be far more
detailed, specifying the kinds of mitigation that should normally be
presented, and explaining that mitigation should be presented both to
encourage reasonable plea negotiation and to attempt to persuade the
prosecution to recommend a lesser sentence.

363

The extent to which the court could require the parties to discuss mitigation or engage in plea
negotiations, at least in federal cases, is limited by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1), as noted
supra note 348. While it is not entirely clear that this rule would prohibit a meet-and-confer requirement
regarding plea negotiations, some courts have interpreted the rule broadly as an “unambiguous mandate”
that “prohibits the participation of the judge in plea negotiations under any circumstances.” United States
v. Corbitt, 996 F.2d 1132, 1135 (11th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Bruce, 976 F.2d 552, 558 (9th
Cir. 1992)). The reason for the rule is that “judicial intervention may coerce the defendant into an
involuntary plea that he would not otherwise enter.” United States v. Werker, 535 F.2d 198, 202 (2d Cir.
1976). But simply requiring the parties to meet and confer prior to the plea hearing—with mitigating
circumstances as one possible point of discussion—would likely not run afoul of the rule and would
encourage attorneys to discuss mitigation more than they currently do. And a number of states also allow
for limited judicial involvement in plea negotiations. Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Judicial Participation in
Plea Negotiations: A Comparative View, 54 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 199, 238 (2006). Florida’s model includes
a presentation involving the judge in which the prosecution presents a summary of its facts of the case,
whereas the defense responds “with his or her own interpretation of the facts, with information on
mitigating facts and with a request for a more lenient disposition.” Id. at 242. For a helpful review of the
history of the limited judicial role in plea bargaining, see Darryl K. Brown, Judicial Power to Regulate
Plea Bargaining, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1225 (2016). And for an interview-based account of the many
ways state judges intervene in plea negotiations, see Nancy J. King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible
Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX.
L. REV. 325, 337–56 (2016).
364 STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.: DEF. FUNCTION § 4-8.3(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2017).
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CONCLUSION
We are at a critical period in criminal justice policy. The public is more
aware than ever about the myriad of problems in the system: hostile police–
community relationships; mass incarceration; systemically unequal racial
treatment. And there is rare bipartisan support from legislatures toward
addressing some of those issues—particularly overly restrictive sentencing
policies. In some ways, the data I report here are very encouraging toward
progress. My data imply that mitigation matters in judges’ sentencing
decisions; that the relationship between mitigation and sentencing makes
sense given the experimental and survey literature; and that judges are
engaging in a careful, modern consideration of mitigation by recognizing
how personal characteristics and circumstances influence culpability and
how evidence and data should impact the weight of mitigation beyond what
the Sentencing Guidelines provide.
But the data are also discouraging in the systemic flaws that they
highlight. They imply that identifying and presenting mitigation is among
the most important parts of a criminal case, and yet defendants have almost
no procedural protections to ensure that step happens effectively. To the
extent the system even requires a thorough investigation, it does not enforce
it through the requirements of effective assistance of counsel. It does not
facilitate a thorough examination into health mitigation, which appears
especially crucial. It does not encourage prosecutors to consider mitigation
in making their extremely consequential decisions. And the Guidelines do
not provide reasonable standards for judges to follow in weighing mitigation,
leading judges to simply sentence outside the Guideline range, reducing
transparency and uniformity.
All of these problems are at least partly solvable, either through
modifications to procedural rules, amendments to ABA guidance and the
Sentencing Guidelines, or policy decisions made by prosecutors’ and public
defenders’ offices. Until there is support for reforms like these, there will
likely continue to be wide variation in the amount and quality of mitigation
presented from case to case, likely leading to unjust disparities among
defendants. My hope is that the data reported in this Article provide a first
step toward advocating for these reforms and encourage greater recognition
of the importance of mitigation at sentencing.
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APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL SUPPORTING DATA
TABLE A1: PRIMARY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND
CORRESPONDING RELIABILITY SCORES
Independent Variable

Smith Index

Relative Seriousness

0.90

Relative Culpability

0.89

Victim Harm—Minimizing

0.90

Victim Harm—Acknowledging

0.96

Remorse—Supported

0.95

Remorse—Unsupported

0.92

Historical Trauma

0.94

Character

0.86

General Family and Social Background

0.78

Collateral Consequences

0.95

Health—Supported

0.90

Health—Unsupported

0.97

Age

0.96

Deterrence

0.88

Incapacitation

0.77

Rehabilitation

0.55
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TABLE A2: WORD COUNTS (AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS)
AND PROPORTIONS OF ALL VARIABLES365
Independent Variable

Average Word Count

Frequency of Use

Relative Seriousness
Relative Culpability

489.07 (625.89)
172.24 (349.59)

88%
38%

Victim Harm—Minimizing
Victim Harm—Acknowledging

22.51 (95.48)
4.07 (15.48)

13%
9%

Remorse—Supported
Remorse—Unsupported

40.40 (122.66)
32.79 (83.77)

16%
35%

Offense Mitigation Total
Historical Trauma

761.09 (791.30)
199.59 (313.88)

97%
61%

Character
General Family and Social Background

336.11 (501.44)
54.83 (109.81)

77%
38%

Collateral Consequences
Health—Supported

86.18 (177.06)
197.94 (409.29)

41%
35%

Health—Unsupported
Age

30.51 (73.96)
26.66 (95.66)

22%
23%

Personal Mitigation Total
Deterrence

935.11 (928.25)
82.33 (175.51)

94%
39%

Incapacitation
Rehabilitation

26.75 (78.08)
70.06 (119.37)

21%
45%

Theories-of-Punishment Total

179.85 (263.27)

62%

365 Average word counts per memorandum were calculated by dividing the total number of words
dedicated to each factor by the total number of memoranda in the sample.
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TABLE A3: REGRESSION DATA OF MITIGATING FACTORS, CONTROLLING FOR CRIME TYPE
Independent Variable

Standardized Beta Weight

p-Value

Relative Seriousness
Relative Culpability

0.095
–0.012

0.066
0.812

Victim Harm—Minimizing
Victim Harm—Acknowledging

0.049
0.055

0.349
0.284

Remorse—Supported
Remorse—Unsupported

–0.103
0.107

0.054
0.035

Historical Trauma
Character

–0.122
–0.189

0.020
0.001

General Family and Social Background
Collateral Consequences

–0.035
–0.177

0.501
0.003

Health—Supported
Health—Unsupported

–0.332
0.051

0.000
0.312

Age
Deterrence

0.038
0.004

0.441
0.949

Incapacitation
Rehabilitation

0.012
0.073

0.820
0.181
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